

Ann Frotsher sieht die MQM als ein Gegenbeispiel für die These der Modernisierungstheorie an, der Modernisierungsprozess mache die ethnische Identitätsbildung „obsolet“ (S. 262). Die MQM beweise das Gegenteil, denn hier würden „ethnische Konflikte oft erst durch einen (...) Modernisierungsprozeß ausgelöst“ (S. 262). Mit dieser Schlußfolgerung wirft Frotsher grundsätzliche Fragen bezüglich unseres Verständnisses des Staats- und Nationsbildungsprozesses in den ehemaligen Kolonialländern auf. Christophe Jaffrelot zum Beispiel siedelt die Frage der nationalen Integration im Jahr 1947 an und stellt fest, dass Pakistan aufgrund des „Beharrens ethnischer Identitäten“ von jeher eine „unerreichte Nation“ ist (*Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation?* New Delhi 2002, S. 7).

Die Autorin bietet mit ihrer Arbeit, auch wenn im Einzelnen strukturell nicht immer nachvollziehbar, ein gute und solide Lektüre und bringt dem Leser die vielschichtigen Herausforderungen des Staates Pakistan nahe. Sie zeigt darüber hinaus, dass Studien dieser Art nicht einmalig bleiben dürfen, sondern weitere detaillierte Kenntnisse der Situation in der Region trotz der schwierigen Quellenlage (siehe beispielsweise S. 189, 196, 228) gesellschaftliche Prozesse verstehen helfen können. Weitere Themen, die zum besseren Verständnis der Gesamtsituation analysiert werden müssten, gibt die Autorin bereits vor. Dazu gehören z. B. die Entwicklung des Sindhi-Nationalismus, den Frotsher als „vorherrschende politische Ideologie der Provinz“ (S. 211) bezeichnet, der Konflikt mit der Haqiqi-Fraktion der MQM (S. 245) und die Rolle der islamistischen Parteien in dem Konflikt (S. 270).

Michael Schied

RANDOLF G. S. COOPER, *The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India. The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 473 pages, £ 55.00. ISBN 0521-82444-3 (hb)

At the turn of the eighteenth century the British fought their decisive wars against their most prominent enemies on the Indian subcontinent, Tipu Sultan of Maisur and the Marathas of central India. Whilst Tipu Sultan was defeated and killed during the siege of his fortress Srirangapatnam at the end of a short military campaign in 1799, the war against the Marathas lasted from 1803 to 1805. However, two separate Maratha wars are distinguishable, one in 1803 and the other in 1804-5. Cooper's book deals with the first war which consisted of the campaign against the Sindhia of Gwalior in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab ('Hindustan Campaign') and the campaign on the Dakhan against the Bhonsles of Nagpur ('Deccan Campaign'). Both campaigns were designed to crush the Maratha power in north India by bringing the Mughals under close British control and preventing the Marathas from raiding Bengal via the Ganga valley. While the British undoubtedly won the war, it was, as Randolph Cooper points out, by no means

such an easy victory as conventional (or traditional) British historiography has made us believe for two centuries.

With 'Western military superiority' in mind, this historiography constructed a biased cultural relationship between Europe and South Asia. 'We manipulated our interpretation of events to make them appear as logical in the imaginary court of human history, or better, scientifically inevitable.' In that respect the Anglo-Maratha campaigns of 1803 provide a highly interesting case study 'where military victory obscured the degree to which a Western power misread an Asian opponent.' According to Cooper, recent military planning and "game theories" in the Pentagon's preparations for the war against Iraq in 2001 respectively in 2002 are the latest outcome of such a cultural bias. This bias is based on a presumptive military and technological superiority constructed by contemporary military officers and historians of the British Empire. Particularly military drill and discipline (education), strategy as well as tactics (doctrine) and cannon casting (weapons) were regarded as superior to any Asian military organisation.

With respect to drill and discipline Cooper convincingly demonstrates that the Marathas were part of a subcontinental military economy familiar with European drill through their *topasses* who served the Portuguese from the eighteenth century onwards. Thus the Maratha simply took advantage of an offer on the Indian military market. With respect to strategy and tactics it was especially Arthur Wellesley, better known as the Lord Wellington who won at Waterloo, who was taught a tough lesson in the battle of Assaye. Maratha artillery not only cannonaded the British forces but reordered and re-formed their lines twice, manoeuvres which were hardly noticed by British officers. And with respect to cannon casting it was also Arthur Wellesley who admitted the superiority of Maratha casting. The observation was forwarded to the London authorities for consideration. However, replacement and modernization of the British Indian armies as well as the introduction of Asian technology were both too expensive to be taken seriously into consideration. Apart from this, Maratha artillery was employed on a large scale and it made massive use of antipersonnel projectiles. In all, this artillery seems to have been closer to mass destructive weaponry than anything in contemporary European military.

How then were the Maratha armies eventually defeated during the said campaigns? The British soon became acquainted with India's military market and employed thousands of the famous and ferocious *pindari* (irregular cavalry) in their army at the beginning of the Deccan Campaign. This indicates that it was not superiority but selective choice which at least put the British on a par with their Indian enemies. The main British advantage was certainly their access to more capital not only from (internal) Indian sources like revenues, taxes, trade profits and credit but also from (external) sources like money and men from Europe. Backed by a global commercial network the British soon learned to participate successfully in the Indian military economy. The line of fortresses on the Dakhan plateau guarded by mercenaries and their commanders could be

purchased with British money since the Maratha did not pay these soldiers regularly. Diplomacy and ready money destroyed the Maratha military command and control capability at the strategic level.

However, deficit spending on wages, ammunition, pensions and diplomacy showed limits by 1803, so that the sudden shortage of money due to the ongoing Napoleonic Wars in Europe prevented governor general Richard Wellesley from successfully completing the Maratha campaigns in 1805. This does not justify the equation of more money = purchasing victory, as Cooper rightly points out. It was the creative ways in which economic and financial means were used during the campaigns, accompanied by clever diplomacy, that dealt a decisive blow to Maratha military logistics and organisation.

In Randolph Cooper's book the importance of a specific subcontinental military economy and military culture is highlighted comprehensively for the first time. The thoroughly researched study stresses the cultural misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the British. At some points the differences between Indian and European military cultures seem to be exaggerated, particularly when dealing with Indian mercenaries and British soldiers. Fighting to death and total destruction was, at that time, also the exception in European theatres of war. Men had to be saved for the next campaign and fortresses to be taken for bargaining during the next peace negotiations. Nevertheless, many British officers contributed to a perception of India's military efficiency which can be read as the beginning of a colonial discourse constructing Indian backwardness, weakness and stagnancy. In this respect Cooper's book is a very important contribution to the historiography of modern India since it deconstructs the notion of a sweeping British military success story and, on the other hand, it presents the complex scenario of military, economic, diplomatic and cultural struggles.

*Michael Mann*

JOHANNES BELTZ (Hrsg.), *Hindu-ABC*. Zürich: Verlag Museum Rietberg, 2004. 138 Seiten, CHF 12,00 / € 8,00. ISBN 3-907077-15-6

Das handliche kleine Buch, 13 x 16 cm, nutzerfreundlich mit großer Spiralbindung und im Bierdeckelkarton, erschien als Begleitpublikation zur Ausstellung „Hinduistisches Zürich – Eine Entdeckungsreise“, die vom 22. Oktober 2004 bis 28. Januar 2005 im Stadthaus Zürich zu sehen war (vgl. dazu den Bericht auf S. 251 ff. in diesem Heft). Es ist meiner Meinung nach vor allem deswegen besonders bemerkenswert, weil hier nicht Indologen, sondern Menschen unterschiedlicher Herkunft aus dem Großraum Zürich zu Wort kommen, die sich als Praktizierende der Weltanschauung verstehen, für die sich seit der britischen Kolonialzeit und über die orientalistischen Wissenschaften des Westens die Bezeichnung „Hinduismus“ eingebürgert hat. Shalini Bharat aus Zürich erläutert dazu im einleitenden Teil ihrer halbseitigen Erklärung (S. 32) kurz und prägnant: „Das Wort „Hinduism“ (dt. Hinduismus) ist ein englisches Wort relativ jungen Ursprungs. Es