Marginality then and now: Shifting Patterns of Minority Status in Brunei Darussalam

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1. Introduction

The enclave Malay Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam on the northern coast of Borneo is perhaps better known for its oil wealth than any aspect of its politics and racial composition - or its history. Brunei was once a great thalassocracy commanding the sea-ways for hundreds of miles around Borneo Island and into the Philippine archipelago. It received rents from the nearer districts and provinces, and tribute from numerous other Malay coastal kingdoms of lesser power. Beneath the direct or indirect territorial sway of this regime of conceivably non-Bornean origin dwelt a myriad hierarchy of tribes farming the riches of the seas, rivers and jungles. But with the growing disruption of traditional archipelagic trade patterns under the European impact by the end of the 18th Century, and the direct interventions of Western "political entrepreneurs" in northern Borneo in the 19th, Brunei became a mere shadow of its former self. It was only narrowly rescued from extinction at the hands of expansionist Sarawak (the kingdom of the "White Rajahs") and British North Borneo (Chartered Company territory, today's Sabah) by the British Government intervention of 1905-06, which established a Residency. (As the territory had shrunk, so the tax burden on what remained had grown more onerous, provoking ever fiercer re-
volts of the tribes.)

Nevertheless, Sarawak and British North Borneo became British colonies in 1946, after the Japanese occupation, and constituent states of the new Federation of Malaysia (based on or around the previously independent Federation of Malaya) in 1963, whereas internal self-rule was restored to the Brunei Protectorate in 1959, full independence in 1984. The discovery of oil onshore in 1929, offshore in 1963, provides a sufficient explanation of Brunei's ability to emerge, against all odds, as a viable micro-state on the modern international stage.

However, not an inch of former territory has ever been recovered. The sad rump of a once great empire consists of four districts, making up a land area of a mere 5,769 square kilometres. Moving from west to east along the northern coast of Borneo, and entering Brunei from Miri in Sarawak, one passes through Belait; Tutong; and Brunei/Muara; before crossing Limbang (also part of Sarawak) or negotiating a maze of esturine creeks to reach non-contiguous Temburong; and finally exiting to Lawas (again Sarawak). Brunei's southern borders are also shared with Sarawak: there is no contact with Sabah or Indonesia. Each of the four districts is based on a river system, though Brunei Town (now Bandar Seri Begawan), the state capital, stands on what is more precisely a long, tidal inlet of glacial origin. Muara is the port; the oil field is around Seria. Labuan, an off-shore island, was annexed by the British Government in 1847, later became a Straits Settlement, and (like Sarawak and Sabah) is today part of Malaysia.

Ethnically speaking, Brunei society is characterised by considerable diversity, despite significant processes of assimilation in recent times. In the Constitution of 1959 and the Nationality Enactment of 1961 seven authentic indigenous groups were identified: Malays (or "Bruneis"), Kedayans, Tutongs, Belaits, Dusuns, Bisayas and Muruts. The present writer was fortunate enough to have a sight of the unpublished census figures for 1981, which, while enumerating all the Muslim groups as "Malay" (i.e. Bruneis, Kedayans and Tutongs, plus presumably the Belaits, of whom few remain unconverted today), still distinguish the Muruts and Dusuns (including presumably Bisayas) as separate ethnic entities - and very correctly so, seeing

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4 On the last revolt of the Dusuns, of the Tutong District especially, see Horton 1987. On revolts just outside the boundaries of present-day Brunei, see note 28, below.
5 For a technical history of Brunei oil, see Harper 1975.
6 The various locations are shown on the map p. 85
7 State of Brunei 1959, Section 29 (2) (a), naming the groups provisionally eligible for membership of the Legislative Council.
8 State of Brunei 1961b, Section 4 (1) (a).
9 Negara Brunei Darussalam n.d.(b).
that the Muruts (i.e. Lun Bawang of Temburong District) are overwhelm-
ingly if not exclusively Christian, and the identity of the majority of Dusun/
Bisaya (in Tutong and Belait Districts, with a few in the south-west of
Brunei District) is defined, not least, by their ancient Bornean religion, offici-
ciated by female *belian*.

The figures thus revealed from the 1981 census, for citizens and Permanent Residents by main racial category, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>111,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusun</td>
<td>7,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murut</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other indigenous</td>
<td>5,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>22,059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Indians and others are added, the grand total of citizens and Perma-
nent Residents was 147,861 for that year, of a total enumerated population
of 192,832.

One point of possibly more special interest is the fact that only
55.9% of the Chinese population of 39,461 were permanently resident, with
or without full citizenship status. Another is the fact that there is yet a
sizeable "indigenous" population apart from the seven "indigenous citizen"
groups mentioned above. This further indigenous population consists
mainly of Ibans, some of whom have obtained citizenship, but rarely by
operation of law as for almost the whole of the first seven groups.

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10 It is of course not ruled out, indeed likely, that some Dusun converts were self-declared
and enumerated as Malay. The figures are certainly not a guide to the extent of Dusun
language use. A dozen or so years later Martin 1995: 242 has estimated 15,000 speakers
of Dusun, with another 600 of "Bisaya".

11 Negara Brunei Darussalam n.d.(a): 1. The most up-to-date figure for Brunei's total popu-

12 *Ibid.*: 97. The number of permanently resident Chinese who have the legal status of Per-
manent Resident is 14,016 while Citizens are 8,043 - i.e. 35.51% and 20.38% respec-
tively. The fact that, apart from the transient Chinese, a substantial proportion of the total
population of any race are not permanently resident is a symptom both of the national
wealth which can employ a large immigrant work-force and of the low level of native skill
which necessitates such employment in order to keep that modern, oil-based economy
running. Needless to say, the resident Chinese - mainly but not exclusively urban-dwelling
- are the descendants of immigrants who were attracted by economic opportunity earlier in
this century.

13 But Ibans too (from Sarawak) feature among the population of transient workers, as do
Kadazans from Sabah. As of 1981, Iban and Kadazan immigrants (mostly Iban, one may
be sure) numbered 7,919 as against the 5,731 "Other indigenous" holding citizenship or
Permanent Residency. On Iban occupational categories in Brunei, Neville 1990: 40 is ger-
mane.
Of course, the intelligent layman will not find it hard to guess that oil wealth, prudently managed, has the potential to "stabilise" whatever *status quo* existed at the point of Independence, in terms of both differential power (between classes) and differential status (between races). But what is more intriguing, and certainly productive as a starting-point for analysis, is to view the contrasts between the political systems and inter-racial dispensations which emerged in the various territories of British Southeast Asia during the process of decolonisation, and to note how the emergent situation in each territory indeed interacted directly or indirectly with events in Brunei.

2. The "alien" minorities in the context of Malaysia

It will be recalled that the colonial government of the Federation of Malaya in the 1950s was in bloody conflict with the Malayan Communist Party for control of population and the power to dictate the political structure after Independence. The British sought to win Chinese "hearts and minds" away from the Communist Party through the offer of citizenship and democratic politics, but the implication of early democratisation was an almost equally early Independence, needless to say. It was in the context of a burgeoning Independence movement of the Malays that Tunku Abdul Rahman's United Malays National Organisation formed and developed the Alliance Party, harnessing UMNO's energies to those of the Malayan Chinese Association in a powerful demonstration of the "unity" and "maturity" of the electorate and Malaya's "preparedness" for Independence in 1957. But it followed from the MCA's involvement, in turn, that the Independence Constitution would accord the Chinese substantial equality of political rights.

In the minute British Protectorate of Brunei, by contrast, there was no revolutionary movement to create the necessity for democratic politics in order to bind ethnic minorities to a late-colonial regime (though the British did believe that democracy was an appropriate strategy for pre-empting revolutionary nationalist tendencies eventually). Nor had there been any incident quite as provocative as the racially egalitarian Malayan Union scheme of 1946, which had prompted the creation of UMNO, as a party of mass resistance led by the aristocracy. In Brunei from 1950 an extraordinarily energetic Sultan, Omar Ali Saifuddin III, saw himself as the rightful leader of his country on the path towards Independence and away from the hovering embrace of Sarawak. Democratic party politics was neither legitimate nor expedient in his perception, only a "national community" sufficiently aware of political issues to deliver loyal support when asked.
But since there was, nevertheless, a dynamic nationalist movement, much inspired by forerunners in Indonesia and Malaya - the Brunei People's Party or Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), an off-shoot of the similarly named left-wing Malay movement of Malaya, and a very far cry from UMNO - the Sultan saw his interest as lying in an extremely cautious approach to Independence, giving priority to consolidation of his own power in advance of both popular participation and the resumption of internal security, defence and foreign policy powers from the British.\(^{14}\)

Thus whereas the 1957 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya marked the beginning of the era of Independence under democracy, the 1959 Constitution of Brunei marked the beginning of the era of monarchical power, under a continuing British protection - and at a level of monarchical power effectively unknown in the pre-colonial feudal past. Although the Sultan had not been able to side-step British and local political pressure for an elective Legislative Council - which was scheduled to meet two years after the promulgation of the Constitution - constant postponements of the elections, and in due course the first legislative session itself, led to a rebellion, which in turn led indirectly to Britain's "residual responsibilities" being maintained until 1984. And while British protection lasted, no opportunities of further consolidation were wasted. The very fact that Her Majesty's Government had surrendered its authority over Brunei administration made the British almost impotent to promote democratic reforms after 1959; indeed, or on the contrary, the British presence in a still faintly "colonial" role was protective to royal consolidation as much as it was to the physical territory and boundaries of the state. The 1962 PRB rebellion and its aftermath illustrate this perfectly. The rebels' desperate attempt to establish a democratic regime and forestall Brunei's absorption into the Federation of Malaysia was rewarded by a vigorous British military intervention and the permanent stationing of a battalion of Gurkhas in the oilfield. The progressive dismantling of democratic structures which ensued up to 1970 was not Colonial Office policy, but nor was it objectionable to all the British interests concerned.\(^{15}\)

Before looking at the ethnic content of the Bruneian nation that was "invented" across these years as a legitimating foundation for monarchical rule in a modern era, or (specifically in this Section) the groups which were left out, we must cast a glance in the direction of Malaya again. The defeat of the MCP's jungle war for Independence in the Malay Peninsula did not

\(^{14}\) The most extensive description, to date, of the role of the Sultan is Hussainmiya 1995 - a basically adulatory text which nevertheless offers many flashes of lucidity.

\(^{15}\) For sundry aspects of political development between 1962-1984, see Braighlinn 1992: 14-17.
affect the growth of a communist-linked popular movement in Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew's youthful People's Action Party was to all intents and purposes a communist front. For his own survival (literally, perhaps - who knows?) Lee looked to Independence through merger with the mainland, so that control of internal security would pass into the hands of a conservative government outside the borders of the city state. However, from Tunku Abdul Rahman's point of view, the admission of such a large Chinese population with their already superior citizenship rights16 (and with or without a strong communist representation), would upset the delicate racial balance in the eleven-state Federation of Malaya.17 Hence the need to secure British connivance in the creation of a super-federation embracing also the three British territories in Borneo: Sarawak (Crown Colony), Sabah (Crown Colony) and Brunei (Protectorate), which the Tunku rather misguidedly understood to be "Malay" societies because of racial affinities. British connivance was duly forthcoming - if the idea of "Malaysia" was not hatched in London in the first place - since the merger of British Borneo with the mainland seemed a perfect formula for decolonisation in a way that would guarantee moderate democratic development in three politically unsophisticated societies, given that the Sultan of Brunei had earlier blocked a mini-federation of the three. In view of the resistance of the Sultan also to wards democratic reform, the Malaysia formula was attractive, not least, in relation to that territory.18

Nevertheless, it may seem with hindsight that the British Government had left things "too late" as far as Brunei was concerned. It was not the case that no "political development" at all had taken place there. In 1961 a markedly restrictive Nationality Enactment had been promulgated, the essential prelude and precondition to the holding of elections a year later (that is, a year behind the schedule originally stipulated in the Constitution). Now it is true that the Sultan was exploring the Malaysia option in a highly favourable spirit, and partly for this reason the anti-Malaysia PRB could win a landslide electoral victory in August 1962; also true that the convening of the Legislative Council was then postponed for several months because the Sultan would have suffered political embarrassment, as well as feeling that his personal sovereignty was challenged, in face of anti-Malaysia motions prepared by the party; and apparent that the rebellion broke out

16 See State of Singapore 1957, Section 4, giving jus soli (citizenship by right of birth in Singapore) regardless of year of birth.
17 I.e. nine States with Malay rulers, and the two former British Colonies of Malacca and Penang.
18 The most comprehensive and authoritative study of the rise of Malaysia is Mohd Noordin 1974.
in December as a consequence of all this.\(^{19}\) And yet, it can hardly be doubted that among the factors that eventually helped to tip the Sultan's own decision against Malaysia in July 1963 the citizenship legislation of the Federation of Malaya loomed large (even if it never "reached the headlines" like the sharing of oil revenues or the issue of the Sultan's precedence among the other Malay rulers).\(^{20}\) Under the constitutional arrangements of the new Federation this legislation was bound to be exported to Borneo in some form, but was anathema to the Brunei elite because so liberal towards ethnic minorities.

First of all, the Chinese of the mainland had been granted citizenship by operation of law on the basis of local birth with one parent locally born, as early as 1952, in the midst of the Emergency. This was followed, at Independence in 1957, by *jus soli* for children born after Independence Day. Registration was also extended on generous terms to adult non-Malays already resident, apart from the locally-born.\(^{21}\) But in Brunei, almost as a retort to the Malayan example and certainly with a sense of horror in face of it, the Chinese were omitted from the preliminary definition of national status in the 1959 Constitution, and admitted to citizenship in 1961 only by naturalisation, or registration for the locally born (except for the children of Chinese fathers thus naturalised or registered, who were to be entitled by operation of law)\(^{22}\); moreover, the terms for naturalisation itself were much

\(^{19}\) Although the Sultan's leanings towards Malaysia are no longer admitted in Brunei-sponsored or inspired writings (cf Hussainmiya 1995), we must remember the pervasive fear of "Communist subversion" through the overseas Chinese, in the British Southeast Asian territories at that time. If this was a powerful argument for Lee Kuan Yew, why not for the Sultan? Even the PRB itself posed a threat to monarchy against which Kuala Lumpur could provide reassurance. There was also the threat of an expansionist Indonesia, where the communist movement was growing steadily in influence.

\(^{20}\) On these issues, see Singh 1984: 194-195. It is notorious that the late Sultan (abdicated 1967, died 1986) kept his own counsel, so he left very little personal evidence of his motivations - a problem experienced, if scarcely admitted, by his biographer (Hussainmiya 1995). However, the sentiments of those close to him are accessible through interview and later citizenship practice in Brunei speaks for itself. For the observations of one confidant of the Sultan, Mohd Jamil al-Sufri, see note 30 below.

\(^{21}\) For over-45s, no language test was required for a grace period of one year. See Federation of Malaya 1959, Section 17 (d). This special facility was maintained for four years in the Federation of Malaya. The relevant Section was in fact repealed in 1971. In 1963, residents of Sabah and Sarawak were given eight years in which to apply (i.e. up to 1971). However, unlike its Peninsular equivalent, Article 16A is still extant. The standard residence condition remains (for local-born) 5 years out of the last 10 on the mainland, 7 out of 10 in Borneo.

\(^{22}\) See State of Brunei 1961b: Sections 8, 5 and 4 (1) (d), respectively.
more demanding than in the Federation of Malaya.\textsuperscript{23} It was inconceivable that Brunei Malay elite opinion would compromise on these principles.\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, the Constitution of Malaysia, which introduced citizenship to the newly emancipated territories of Sarawak and Sabah in 1963, could not be less than all-embracing towards the native groups (whether or not they were identifiable, or self-identifying, as "Malay").\textsuperscript{25} One only needs to consider that Brunei, too, had incorporated seven of its native ethnic groups as "Subjects of the Sultan" (1959) or "indigenous tribes" entitled to citizenship by operation of law (1961). But this being so, why should Brunei look askance at the political incorporation of the almost identical groups of native population across the borders, in territories of Borneo which were historically under Brunei's sway? The key to the anomaly lies also within Borneo history, specifically in the history of Iban expansion, which had in a sense "pursued" the shrinking Brunei eastwards and taken root within its reduced borders during the 20th Century.\textsuperscript{26} The British in the early years of

\textsuperscript{23} Viz., 20 years' residence in the 25 years preceding the application. Cf 10 years out of 12 in Malaya/Malaysia. Both countries operate Malay language tests for registration and naturalisation, but Brunei's are notoriously difficult - and since Independence rarely held. (Looking ahead ten years from 1961, the vital importance of knowing the current practice rather than what the written law allows, is seen in the fact that after 1971, Section 6 (1) of the Nationality Enactment, under which the child of an alien by an indigenous woman could be registered by its mother, was withdrawn, yet without being formally de-gazetted.) Brunei's registration residence rule is 12 out of 15 years.

\textsuperscript{24} Incidentally, the Brunei Nationality Enactment, though vastly more exclusive with regard to the Chinese than comparable legislation of the Federation of Malaya, shows a clear structural affinity with it, in terms of its three "routes": operation of law, registration for locally-born non-indigenous, and naturalisation for foreign-born non-indigenous, with a language test for both registration and naturalisation. The affinities are clearly due to the common British draftsmanship.

\textsuperscript{25} Malaysian citizenship by operation of law was bestowed on Ibans as one of the native groups of Sarawak; indeed for avoidance of doubt it was clarified that residence in Brunei on Malaysia Day, 1963, did not prevent any Iban born in Sarawak from being a Malaysian citizen! See Federation of Malaysia 1993, Second Schedule (under Article 39 [re. Article 14 (1) (a)]), 2. (All references to the Constitution of Malaysia in the present study have been checked from the latest edition available to the author, to ensure that the provisions in question are still in force.)

\textsuperscript{26} For insights into the dynamics of Iban movement north-eastwards, into Sarawak and beyond, see Morgan 1968, or Uchibori 1984: 214-216. Whether the Ibans' up-river longhouses in Brunei were established by group migrations direct from Sarawak, or indirectly by transient oilfield labourers who went up-river to survey for possibilities of settlement, is not known to the present writer (but see a claim that they migrated from Simanggang, Batang Rajang and Ulu Kapit in Sarawak in the 1920s, in Mohd Jamil 1992: 86). Certainly we may take it that Iban settlement has been a 20th Century phenomenon. (It would be a pity not to mention also, if only in passing, the Penans, who were still nomadic until prevailed upon by the government, around 1962, for its own security reasons, to settle and
the Brunei Protectorate maintained a policy of free access for anyone of "Malaysian" race - including the Ibans so vital as a source of labour in the oilfield.27 But after World War II, when the Brunei elite became nervous about the creeping incorporation of their territory into Sarawak (by a process of cajolery and administrative coordination by a colonial High Commissioner, they thought, where the previous Brooke Dynasty had employed trickery or the terror of headhunting marauders), the Iban immigrants began to be defined as aliens.28 By the time of the Nationality Enactment they were given automatic right of citizenship only on the basis of local birth to two locally-born parents.29

As has been suggested, this protective barrier could surely not withstand the centralising and equalising pressures of integration if Brunei agreed to merger. The idea here insinuated is not that the rise of Malaysia had any causative effect on Brunei's citizenship legislation with regard to the Ibans - for the legislation had a prior existence - but rather that this previously elaborated system of differential rights among the Bornean races resident in modern Brunei was a factor which would inevitably complicate the federalising endeavour, in ways which perhaps neither the British nor the Malayan leaders were equipped to anticipate or understand. At any rate, it is consistent that the PRB, which aspired to reunite the three territories of northern Borneo as a distinct Borneo Federation under democracy, wanted

27 "Little restriction is placed on the free movement of aliens of Malaysian race": see Black/State of Brunei 1937: 4.

28 By an Order in Council on 3 July 1948, to be precise. See the report of the reiteration of this position in late 1954, in Borneo Bulletin, 11 December 1954, and the short commentary in State of Brunei 1955: 47. It is probably true to say that the present territory of Brunei has only experienced armed incursion by Kayans from the Baram to the west (met in Dusun folk-memory in Belait and Tutong Districts), and Bisayas from the Limbang to the south (still an element in the folk-memory of Kedayans of Sengkurong in the Brunei/Muara District - personal communications by the Chief Kathi, Hamid bin Bakal - and see Stubbs 1905: 4; 1968: 88), but both types of marauding are difficult to disentangle from tax revolts against the Brunei Government and the designs of Charles Brooke on the territory of Brunei that remained after Limbang itself was annexed in 1890 - and Brooke-inspired marauding warfare is most famously remembered, generally, as Iban (i.e. "Dayak") warfare.

29 State of Brunei 1961b, Section 4 (1) (b). (Cf. This was the same restricted facility as had been given to Malayan Chinese in 1948, but was superseded in 1952.) Strangely, Section 4 (1) (c) (ii) in the English version appears to contradict this, by awarding citizenship also to non-locally born of local-born parents - though the Malay text is slightly stricter, in specifying that such non-local birth would have to post-date the commencement of the Enactment. Anyway, local birth to two locally-born parents is very definitely the operative rule at present. Other local-born must seek registration; foreign-born, naturalisation.
Ibans in Brunei to be accorded equal rights, whereas the Brunei Malay nobility showed signs of fearing the political dynamism of Ibans even within Brunei as an enclave, let alone in a revived, multi-ethnic "Brunei empire" where monarchical rule as well as the authority of Islam would have been drastically diluted.\(^{30}\)

After the traditional elite had won the internal political struggle with outside (British) help - thus being confirmed as the "heirs" to an erstwhile disintegrating society which the British had pacified - but had also maintained their state's autonomy against outside (Malaysian) encroachment, this elite would find itself in a position to elaborate a new system of Malay dominance, based not only on differential status for distinct cultures as in the past\(^{31}\) but on the prospect of equality of status for any who would embrace Malay culture and identity, and swell the indigenous Islamic interest that was wary of the real or imagined "Chinese enemy" and therefore loyal to the Sultan, its protective bulwark and patron. Through mass assimilation in the medium term, a credible, standard-bearing Malay nation-state could also project its ideological and cultural example towards former subject territories, free of the challenges and obstacles of trying to administer them in the short term.\(^{32}\) A detailed account of the dynamics of the post-1984 state ideology of a *Negara Melayu Islam Beraja* (the "Malay Islamic Monarchy" concept, or MIB) is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it will be possible to pick out some early indicators of assimilationist intent.

\(^{30}\) Indeed the idea of a North Borneo Federation, promoted by the British Government, was not the least of the issues dividing the PRB from the Sultan in the 1950s. In late 1960 the party staged a protest rally to demand immediate inclusion of the Ibans as citizens (and thus voters), and more generous terms for Chinese and immigrant Indonesians (*Borneo Bulletin*, 5 November 1960). PRB egalitarian sentiment is also seen between the liberal lines of the report of an impressive public consultation on the Constitution, State of Brunei 1954 - cf note 44, below. The energetic qualities of Iban culture cast the group as rather predictable supporters of a radical party in a conservative and highly hierarchical Sultanate. As has been said, in a non-political context, "The Iban live in a competitive, highly egalitarian society in which personal achievement is the prime measure of an individual's worth." (Sather 1985: 3). On their dynamic geographical expansion, see note 26, above. For another expression of PRB support for the emancipation of the Ibans, see Azahari 1959: 138. For a defence of their exclusion from automatic citizenship, by a confidant of the Sultan, see Mohd Jamil 1992: 85-86. On the Sultan's abhorrence of a North Borneo Federation on the grounds of the feared "submergence of the position of the Bruneis", see *ibid*.: 156.

\(^{31}\) Again see Brown 1976; King 1994.

\(^{32}\) On Brunei elite pretensions as guardians of the supreme, pristine authenticity of Malay culture amidst the region's upheavals, see Kershaw, R., 1984: 76, 81, 83. At the time of writing, the Brunei Government has a daily page on the Internet!
alongside discrimination, from a more thorough survey of relevant legislative and administrative developments up to Independence.33

3. Defining and classifying Brunei's indigenous people

Taking a demographic approach first of all, one notices that since 1971 the official presentation of census statistics has absorbed all the seven, basic "indigenous" groups, defined as such in the Brunei Nationality Enactment of 1961, into the category of "Malay".34 Yet clearly the meaning of "Malay", here, is not simply a constitutional one; equivalent to "indigenous citizen", for it is further subdivided, in the published statistics, by residential status (Brunei Citizen; Permanent Residents; temporary and others).35 Thus it is more fundamentally an ethnic category, or at least a pseudo-ethnic category, strongly inferring (and surely not unintentionally in an era of "nation-building") that all the indigenous of Brunei share a single ethnicity, even though (without breach of logic) the distribution of the members of the cultural grouping in question is admitted to be not totally coterminous with the present boundaries of this much eroded and truncated (besides ethnically penetrated) state.

The complexity even of the simplified, unpublished 1981 census classification (excerpted in Section 1, above) reflects a reality on the ground that must have been every bit as pluralistic in 1961 when access to citizenship was crystallised and codified. This calls for a short discussion of the terminology. There is much to be said for sticking to the 1961 terminology as a foundation, even for sociological purposes, while introducing new terms judiciously where changing sociological reality argues for it.

The 1961 Enactment, long-awaited precondition for the holding of elections to the Legislative Council (as has been explained in Section 2), listed as qualified to be citizens ("Subjects of the Sultan") by operation of law "the following indigenous groups of the Malay race, namely, Belait, Bi-

33 On many facets of Brunei's new state ideology, see Braighlinn 1992.
34 See the rationalisation of this policy - with no hint of any "sinister" motive towards the ethnic groups thus "cleansed" from the record - in Negeri Brunei 1973: 34.
35 Cf Negara Brunei Darussalam 1989: 45. In other words, a Malay born in, say, Miri, Sarawak, with no ancestral connection with the present territory of Brunei, and not even a member of one of the seven designated puak of Brunei, but long settled in Seria with Permanent Residency (or not settled at all but simply on a visit on the night of the census!), would be included in this category.
sayah, Brunei, Dusun, Kedayan, Murut or Tutong". The formulation created a constitutional category of "Malay" (of Brunei) even while invoking membership of a putative, common racial and/or cultural group (of archipelagic Southeast Asia), also "Malay". In fact, if there was a cultural content to the term, here, it was not equivalent to the cultural definition in Peninsular Malay States law that restricts certain rights, such as priority for citizenship, to Muslims who speak the Malay language and practise Malay custom. It was almost synonymous with the bumiputera concept coined in Malaysia post-1963 to encompass the non-Muslim indigenes of Sarawak and Sabah within the scope of the new federation's most authentic citizenry and recipients of special native rights. In other words it lacked a serious cultural referent, but referred, rather, to a biological race, in the very broad sense of "Malayo-Polynesian" (the peoples sometimes called, in British colonial usage pre-Malaysia, the "Malaysian" race or races), though subject to a geographical limitation. At the same time, it is to be noted that although the meaning of "Malay" in this context is "racial" and imprecise, the seven precisely named groups that are comprised therein were able to be thus specified because of their well-defined linguistic and cultural traits and associated identity - in today's parlance, their "ethnicity". At any rate, there was absolutely no implication at this point that, say, the Dusuns, were already "Malay" in a cultural sense. It was however precisely in the hope of assimilating them in the long run, or at least of mobilising them as allies of the Brunei Muslims' self-defence against the Chinese, that they were declared to be citizens by operation of law, in spite and in toleration of their cultural distinctiveness at that time. It was a prelude, in other words, to an historic departure from the more or less passive role of the Brunei State as

36 See State of Brunei 1961b: Section 4 (1) (a). The basic rule requires local birth, but under 4 (1) (c) (i) a member of one of the seven specified groups could be born elsewhere, provided his or her father was locally born. An earlier constitutional document, of 1954, in which an incomplete list of three of the groups, besides the Bruneis (but with the addition of Dayaks - i.e. Ibans), are proposed as primary recipients of the status of "Subject of the Sultan", is cited in note 44, below. Subsequently, the seven (excluding the Ibans) were accorded native status in the Constitution for the purpose of election to the Legislative Council pending a Nationality Enactment - see State of Brunei 1959, Section 29 (2).

37 I.e. citizenship by operation of law in the Federation of Malaya, the right to which for Malays carried only very nominal, further conditions regarding birth in, or family connection with, a Malay State.

38 Whereas a Malay from Miri who is not a member of the seven designated "authentic indigenous" groups of Brunei would be combined with these in a census report (cf note 35, above), conversely the precise geographical criterion for citizenship by operation of law leaves any members of the seven ethnic groups from beyond the borders (and there are not a few) outside the scope of this right. Like foreign Malays (or Chinese), in principle they can only be naturalised.
proselytizer in the past, whereby Islam had served more as an exclusive status-marker for Bruneians than focus of "national unity".

But whereas the Dusuns and Muruts were granted formal constitutional equality in the context of citizenship, despite religious "deviation", the demarcation of Kedayans from Bruneians may be seen as subtly discriminating against the former, in as much as the differentiation of these Brunei-Malay speaking agriculturalists (traditional suppliers of food to the capital, but represented also in Tutong and Temburong) was maintained vis-à-vis the Malays of the Water Village (with their internal social hierarchy reaching up through tiers of aristocracy and nobility to the Sultan). On the other hand, Kedayans, as Muslims, were granted formal eligibility to accede to the highest posts in the government, under the Constitution: "No person shall be appointed to be Menteri Besar or Deputy Menteri Besar or State Secretary unless he is a Malay professing the Muslim religion and belonging to the Shafeite sect of that religion."

In this context, "Malay" appears to take on its Peninsular Malay, cultural definition (language, religion, custom), but serving similarly as a qualification for certain political rights, excluding the Christians and "pagans" of Brunei from the highest offices. One personage who was included, importantly, was the first Menteri Besar under the Constitution, Pehin Datu Perdana Menteri Dato Paduka Haji Ibrahim bin Mohamed Jahfar. He had entered Brunei government service from the Crown Colony of Labuan during the First World War - a Malay of Penang and Peninsular Malay States descent, not a Brunei. (Yet families such as Dato Ibrahim's would not be eligible for operation of law in 1961, only naturalisation, unless admitted by special authority, though it is believed no language test was ap-

39 The use of the term "nobility" for descendants of Sultans is adopted from Brown 1976, 1984 - with a little reluctance, perhaps because the present writer hails from a society in which all "noble" titles are created by the monarch, while the concept of "aristocracy" tends to be applied more to inherited traits and indubitably upper-class culture regardless of title. Although a Brunei Chief Clerk from the pengiran kebanyakan (a remote descendant of a Sultan and probably a concubine) may not have much recognisably upper-class culture, he has enough standing in village society to attract the English epithet "minor aristocracy", yet none of the rank and power which would comfortably justify his classification as "nobility", even "minor nobility".

40 See State of Brunei 1959, Section 4 (5), as amended (to include a Deputy Menteri Besar) by State of Brunei 1963, Section 3 (b).

41 ... in a way that the Constitutions of Sabah and Sarawak, derivative from the Constitution of Malaysia, 1963, did not do.

plied to Malays in those days.) This anomaly in Brunei affairs may be taken, tentatively, as illustrating two phenomena.

Firstly, the identity of elite Bruneis was at least not less eclectic or incorporative towards Malays from other centres in the Malay world than towards Muslims from other districts of Brunei (one suspects that, where the individual under assessment held an appointment from the Sultan of Brunei, he was rather more likely to be acknowledged than a Kedayan or Tutong farmer!). We should not forget, in this connection, that the identity of Bruneis is indisputably a Malay identity because of the institution of the Sultanate, Islam, and Malay language and literacy (however "exotic" the dialect by Peninsular standards). Historically, ethnic Brunei society has been an outpost of Malay culture in an alien environment, whether or not one postulates an immigrant origin for their most primordial ancestors. Bruneis identify themselves as Melayu no less readily than Brunei, and even did so in an exclusive way, at one time, in the Brunei context.44

43 Under a new Section 5A of the Constitution, added by State of Brunei 1963, Section 3 (c), it is stipulated that both the Menteri Besar and Deputy Menteri Besar must be a "Subject of the Sultan", but it is not stated that this status (equivalent to citizenship in the Nationality Enactment) must be gained by operation of law. What may be of much greater significance for Brunei's first Menteri Besar is that the limiting constitutional criteria for that appointment laid down in 1959 (stipulating merely a "Malay Muslim"), had been liberalised away from the proposal in State of Brunei 1954: 6, viz., "To occupy the office of Chief Minister one should be chosen from among the senior officials of the Brunei Government, and may not under any circumstances be thus appointed if not being of Malay race, born an original Malay of Brunei, and of Muslim religion." Translation note: Melayu jati Brunei, rendered here as "original Malay of Brunei", could even conceivably be as restrictive as "ethnic Brunei", since this document, in another section - see following note - listed Melayu Brunei separately from other groups of indigenous, including Kadaysans. If this surmise were to be correct, then the Kadaysans were indeed unexpectedly favoured by the wording of the 1959 Constitution, perhaps thanks to the non-Bruneian origins of the Menteri Besar-to-be!

44 Of special interest and significance is that in State of Brunei 1956, one of the earliest documents of constitutional significance in which the indigenous population was defined in order to allocate political rights (in this case, Entry Permits), Article 2 refers not to "Brunei" as the first in the list of seven core groups, but "Malay". Or see an even earlier document, State of Brunei 1954: 38, where, quite similarly, in the section on the proposed definition of "Subject of the Sultan", the first category is described thus: "Indigenous people of Brunei [orang asli Brunei], that is, Brunei Malays, Dusuns, Kedaysans, Muruts and Dayaks who have resided for generations in Brunei." (Incidentally, however, on pp 46-47 the Dayaks are not proposed for inclusion in an amorphous bangsa Melayu in connection with a general equality of rights). As for the second category on p 38, it is strikingly receptive to Malays from other states: "Any Malays whatsoever (of Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah, Labuan or Indonesia) who were born in Brunei." BUT in the Constitution's list of groups eligible provisionally for election to the Legislative Council - State of Brunei 1959, Section 29 (2) - specifically the ethnic Bruneis are called, again, "Malay".
Secondly (but not unconnected with the idea of an "outpost"), the identity of elite Bruneis was certainly more eclectic and incorporative towards Malays from outside than towards non-Muslim Dusuns or Christian Muruts. In this light, the extension of "Malay" status to Dusuns and Muruts in 1961 was even more clearly not connected with inclusive cultural definition, but with a strategy of political incorporation.

And one really should say, in this connection, "mere" political incorporation, for in another critical context it would appear that cultural definition, applied exclusively, overruled political incorporation. To the best of the present writer's knowledge, entry to the Brunei Administrative Service today is doubly restricted: both (a) in the terms of the Malay Muslim criterion for appointment to the highest offices; and (b) by reference to indigenous status under the Nationality Enactment, i.e. birth into a puak jati ("original tribe"). Aspect (b) did not come in early enough (or was not strictly enforced early enough) to exclude, among others, the son of Dato Ibrahim, Pehin Isa (General Adviser to the present Sultan), but younger Bruneis in the BAS look forward to the day when retirements will have weeded out the remaining anomalies to leave a purely "national" elite administrative cadre. At least the qualification for appointment as Prime Minister (previously Menteri Besar) was amended very publicly on the eve of Independence to exclude non-members of Bruneian indigenous groups: "No person shall be appointed to be Prime Minister unless he is a Brunei Malay professing the Muslim religion and belonging to the Shafeite sect of that religion."45

However, while Malays of Malaysian origin are now excluded under the "indigenous" criterion, native Bruneians who are not Muslim are as ever excluded by the "Malay Muslim" criterion.46 What has begun to emerge

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45 State of Brunei 1983a, Article 3. The present Prime Minister, incidentally, is the Sultan.
46 The belief that entry to BAS is similarly restricted is based upon a mixture of personal communication and hearsay. The relevant Standing Orders must be one of the best guarded documents in an already very secretive bureaucratic system. Still, it is manifest that the puak jati part of the rule had its origins in the mid-1960s, subsequent not only to the conceptualization of "most authentic citizen" status by the Nationality Enactment, but also to the failure of merger with the Federation of Malaya and other territories, and the replacement of senior Malayan civil servants with British expatriates. (State of Brunei 1954: 8, at least, was liberal on this point, in stipulating simply that BAS officers should be Malay, because as magistrates they would need to be thoroughly familiar with Muslim law.) But it is understood on good authority that the composite (indigenous/Sunni Muslim) rule came into force in about 1973. Meanwhile, the persistence of cultural distance (rationalised by some Malays as "innate racial difference") and an associated reluctance to admit Dusuns to eligibility to senior posts is seen in the general practice of marking Dusun converts as Dusun Mualap ("Dusun convert"), not Melayu, on their new Identity Cards, in spite of their "supreme cultural sacrifice".
"between the lines" of sundry regulations, published or unpublished, is that while the Brunei Government bases its criteria for membership of the national community on "race" in the loose, biological, sense which excludes the Chinese, it is also "racist" in another sense, where it excludes subgroups of "the Bornean race" on grounds of cultural allegiance or ethnicity. It seems symptomatic that whereas the leader of the Dusun community, Orang Kaya Pekerma Dewa Lukan Uking, was given a post as an "Assistant Minister" from the mid-1960s into the 1970s, no "ethnic" representation is seen today, informal or otherwise, apart from the ceremonial offices of Menteri Darat ("up-country Ministers"), or Kapitan China ("Chinese Headmen").

Still, Muruts and Dusuns do continue to be recognised as part of the indigenous core of Brunei's citizens today, even if culturally and politically peripheral. By contrast, the Ibans (and Penans) were excluded from that core in 1961, citizenship by operation of law being granted in principle only to individuals locally born whose parents "were both born in the State". "The State" signified here is the State of Brunei within its modern boundaries. Ethnic groups whose heartland lay elsewhere in the old Brunei empire were neither "claimed" for Brunei in irredentist fashion nor encouraged to "move to the motherland". It has already been inferred that the Brunei elite feared being swamped by immigrating Ibans just as much as they would have been overawed by Iban/Kadazan majorities in a notional Federation of North Borneo; and more immediately could have been discomfited by the voting preferences of the Ibans in the 1962 elections, for which the Nationality Enactment was the prelude and precondition. Not that Ibans were unwelcome as workers: to some extent, the survival of Brunei through oil wealth depended on their labour. But this very dependence could be viewed as politically ominous in the long run, not much less so than the economic power of the Chinese - who have been granted even less ease of access to citizenship than the Ibans. Most strikingly, unlike the Federation of Malaya and Malaysia (1957 and 1963), Brunei did not accord jus soli to non-indigenous persons born on its territory after Independence, nor offer transitional facilities for registration to persons already resident.

To round off this profile of groups, political statuses and terminology, we should consider the new terms that are emerging to cope with changing sociological reality in Brunei. Not only economic development but administrative unity and a "melting-pot" education system have become factors for linguistic convergence and for extensive intermarriage between the indigenous groups, including Muslim marriages with non-Muslims.47 Since con-

47 For references to intermarriage, among many other factors for, in turn, further decline of languages in Brunei and their replacement by a form of Brunei Malay as first language,
version of the non-Muslim partner is compulsory under Brunei law as a condition of such marriage, the general community of Bruneian Muslims is expanding at a faster rate than natural population increase. More fundamentally, cultural and linguistic differences between the existing Muslim groups are becoming progressively eroded among the younger cohorts. This, in combination with growing "national" consciousness and/or ideological pressures in this direction and/or changing practice by the National Registration Department, has created a subjective need for a term to embrace all Bruneian Muslims. What seems to be happening is not the rise of a new term but an incipient shift of Melayu Brunei from its role as synonym for orang Brunei (Bruneis) into an aggregative term for all indigenous Bruneian Muslims. This is indeed the term used in the Malay text of the Constitutional Amendment of 1983 on the qualification to be Prime Minister. It is not far-fetched to suggest, also, that officials from the Brunei group have come to perceive a need to play down their ancestral primacy in the stratified population of Brunei, by consciously severing the old, exclusive link between the Melayu Brunei terminology and the society of Kampong Ayer. Needless to say, however, if the new usage entices other groups also into playing down their ancestral identity, there is a gain for the government and governing class in terms of a less pluralistic population to administer.

A great deal of ambiguity can be expected for a considerable time to come, not least because the Malay language lacks an adjectival inflection to convey membership of a polity as distinct from an ethnic group, where a polity takes its name from an ethnic group or vice-versa. Not that the English language is a paragon of consistency in this regard, but "Malayan" always seemed a useful concept in contrast to "Malay", and "Bruneian" has obvious utility in reference to holders of Brunei citizenship collectively, or the Muslims of Brunei comprehensively (both ethnic Bruneis and others) if paired with "Muslim". The discussion in this article thus far has been at pains to refer to the community of indigenous Muslims, not differentiated by original ethnic group, as "Bruneian Muslims". "Bruneian Malays" would be almost equally acceptable, for the present writer. But it would almost certainly be unrealistic to expect or hope that this term could ever become established in English usage in Brunei, given the powerful influence that Melayu Brunei in its new, eclectic, sense must exert in favour of "Brunei

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48 Although applied sluggishly to Dusun converts (see note 46), Tutongs have been "Malay" on Identity Cards since 1961.

49 See reference in note 45, above, and the quotation in the text.
Malay". At most, there may be some hope for "Bruneian" as the equivalent of rakyat Brunei or "Brunei citizen" - but this would include Ibans and Chinese.\textsuperscript{50}

4. Conclusion

At all events, the key issue in inter-ethnic relations in Brunei can reasonably be argued to be between total assimilation and legitimated group identity, at least for the indigenous target-groups of nation-building strategies. The lack of democratic institutions affects the non-Muslim indigenous insidiously by denying them a voice in defence of their cultures. A coercive nationhood, indeed! This arguably overshadows the discrimination faced by the non-citizen Permanent Residents - though this is a serious enough matter for the persons concerned (characteristically, Ibans and Chinese) in the areas of education (where government schools make sundry charges, and access to the local university or scholarships for study abroad is barred in principle); employment (prohibited in the government sector, increasingly limited in the corporate sector - i.e. Shell, banks, etc. - with the effect of a steady emigration of young Chinese professionals since Independence); and travel (subject to the dubious facility of International Certificates of Identity, in the absence of a Brunei passport).\textsuperscript{51} Numbers of Chinese farmers, regardless of citizenship, are affected by the recent total ban on pig-farming and pork-markets. All Chinese, regardless of citizenship, are now denied a Chinese-medium education, under the integration of private schools to the national curriculum and language media.\textsuperscript{52} And applicants for citizenship, if ever they are called for interview, face the obstacle of an ungazetted new re-

\textsuperscript{50} It does not appear that any alternative to "Brunei Malay" is likely to find a place in the vocabulary of Shell, where it shades off into bumiputera, regardless of religion (as in the Bornean territories of Malaysia). This may be because not many Shell expatriates are aware that not all Brunei indigenous are Muslim. In other words, Shell takes rather at face value the constitutional "unity of Malays" à la Nationality Enactment, tending to treat its long-term cultural goal as an already realized fact. This seems a plausible enough construction to place on the title of the Malay Technology Museum, which Shell donated, and which enshrines the pre-industrial technology of all native groups.

\textsuperscript{51} The background to the disinformation spread by Economist Intelligence Unit 1992: 45, and 1996: 64, to the effect that Chinese Permanent Residents can at least travel on British Passports, is difficult to penetrate. Likewise the 50% inflation of the Chinese population figures by this source.

\textsuperscript{52} A development sufficiently "sensitive", perhaps, to be obscured if not denied by one UBD study, Dunseath 1996: 286.
quirement: "cultural awareness". Meanwhile, citizen Ibans who aspire to join the armed forces have to convert to Islam as well.53

The linkage between inferior minority rights - especially of the non-Muslim indigenous - and the general decline of democratic institutions since the 1960s (or as ideologues of MIB would have it, the restoration of authentic Brunei political forms after the British-imposed aberration of a Legislative Council) is not conspicuous. But in essence, where there is no "popular political process", not only is there unlikely to be an ethnic political party to represent the citizen members of a particular group or groups: minority interests can never even be articulated through a class or ideologically-based party responsive to a district (and possibly ethnic) constituency. In a system of representative democracy it is difficult to imagine Iban longhouses converting *en masse* in return for an electricity generator, supplied by the government through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as was happening in Brunei in the early 1990s. The generator would be promised by politicians in return for the longhouse vote!

Certainly the abolition of elections in 197054, and ultimately of the Legislative Council itself in 198455, has future significance far beyond the boundaries of ethnic minorities. Most patently it pre-empts the open articulation and integration of class interest in a society where economic inequality is more salient, and more clearly correlated with differential political power, than ethnic diversity will ever be. But with regard to the persistence of ethnic stratification, the abolition of the legislature casts a light of historical irony on the divisive Nationality Enactment, whose original intention was not to divide, as such, but to lay one of the foundation stones of democracy by defining a reasonably inclusive electorate - an electorate which would no doubt have utilised the potential for ethnic self-expression and self-defence among its constituent parts, despite the partial disenfranchisement of two groups.

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53 State of Brunei 1983b, 2 (1), derived from State of Brunei 1961a. This does not apply to indigenous groups such as the Dusuns, contrary to an opinion in Brown 1984: 29.

54 State of Brunei 1970.

55 Negara Brunei Darussalam 1984b.
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