The Politics of Factionalism in Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party

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Introduction

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) swift rise from a small opposition to Taiwan’s biggest ruling party has rekindled the outside world’s interest in the domestic political developments on the small democratic island-state close to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A series of questions are up for debate: What are the DPP’s true intentions? How will President Chen Shuibian handle cross-strait relations? In 1997 Taiwan expert Matei Mihalca still described the DPP as “an ideological, inflexible party” (Mihalca, 08.09.1997). After the presidential election in March 2000 National Security Advisor Xiao Meiqing (DPP) countered such criticism:

“Some people say we have a lot of fundamentalists in the party. But in fact the party has only been founded 14 years ago. Within 14 years the DPP has made many changes and transformations and adjusted to new circumstances. I think the DPP is a very pragmatic and flexible party.” (Xiao Meiqing, interview with the author, 05.09.2000).

The accusation that the DPP is an ideological and inflexible party full of fundamentalists stems from the fact that the party has been mainly perceived in its rampant factionalism and its explicit advocacy of Taiwan Independence (TI) in 1991. At the same time, neither factionalism nor the party’s controversial party platform prevented the DPP from adopting pragmatic and flexible policies throughout the 1990s. This is the paradox at the heart of the DPP’s existence.

In this article I argue that the elite conflict within the DPP throughout the late 1980s and 1990s not only greatly shaped the party’s development

\[1\] In the 01 December 2001 parliamentary election the DPP received 38.67% of the votes (87 seats), the KMT 30.22% (68 seats), the PFP 20.44%, the TSU 5.78% (13 seats) while the NP garnered only 0.44% (1 seat) (Central Election Commission). Available from the web: http://www.cec90.gov.tw/emain.htm (downloaded 30 December 2001).
but that it also had major repercussions on the overall development of Taiwan's polity. Study of the DPP’s factionalism is thus an essential prerequisite for a better understanding of Taiwan’s domestic politics. But how can factions within the DPP be envisaged? Shelley Rigger quotes in her *From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party* DPP politician and former party-chairman Yao Jiawen as calling the DPP “sanjiao, jiuliu [a saying which refers to the three religions Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism and the nine schools of thought in Chinese tradition]” (Rigger 2001, p. 71). It reflects the diversity of a party that incorporates supporters from varying social backgrounds and politicians who believe in greatly differing political philosophies.

Regarding the party’s internal organization Rigger describes the DPP’s factions as institutionalized, with formal organizational structures such as offices and staffs (ibid, p. 71–74). Such a portrayal of DPP factionalism however downplays the factions’ opaque and informal nature. While the institutionalization of DPP-factions was contemplated by the party leadership in the late 1980s (Wu 1995, p. 96), up until the present day factions do not have a public program or ideology. They do not openly name their followers, and the faction composition of main party branches such as the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and Central Standing Committee (CSC) does not depend on the factions’ size but on inter-factional horse-trading. Even the DPP’s headquarters describes its factions as merely semi-institutionalized (DPP Document, 30.07.2001). It is thus very hard to define the exact strength of each faction and thereby its respective influence within the various party institutions. While Shelley Rigger conceptualizes DPP factions as quasi-autonomous actors vis-à-vis party institutions such as the CEC and CSC, Party Congress, Party staff, LY-caucus and the Municipal Executive Alliance (Rigger 2001, pp. 76 and 93), Taiwanese scholar and faction-expert Huang Teh-fu argues that factionalism within the DPP encompasses all administrative levels and penetrates all party institutions (Huang 1992, pp. 93–94).

As evident from the above discussion generalizations need to be made. One generalization is that factions are usually characterized by their dyadic patron-client networks and tend to be “ideology-free, interest-centered and power-motivated” (Cheng and Chou 2000, p. 44). At the present stage the DPP includes at least six fairly different party factions: The New Era, New Energy, New Tide, Justice Alliance, Welfare State Alliance, Taiwan Independence Alliance and a meta-faction on parliamentary level, the Mainstream Alliance, which comprises all but the New Era and New Tide faction (Rigger 2001, p. 73). These factions do not only vary in size and composition but also in terms of their inner mechanisms. Amongst them the New Tide faction differs from the other DPP factions quite considerably insofar
as it “has a well-defined ideology and strong policy preferences” (ibid, p.95). Many scholars go even further and describe the New Tide as a party within a party (Arrigo 1993, p.161 and Schubert 1994, p.251).

The internal divisions of the DPP have often raised the question how this deeply fragmented opposition party has managed to stay united throughout all these years. It did not always manage to do so, as the break-off of the Labor Party (LP) in 1987 showed. But the LP-split had no lasting impact on the party’s development (Far Eastern Economic Review, hitherto FEER, 12.11.1987). Nor did the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), founded by dissatisfied DPP-politicians in 1996, affect the DPP’s rise to power (Taiwan Political Digest, hitherto TPD, No.25).² So how did the DPP remain united despite its many factional divisions? And what are the prospects for the future development of the party, given that it has to share power after the 01 December 2001 Legislative Yuan (hitherto LY) election?

I. From radical protest movement to mainstream governing party

Party consolidation and development, 1986–1991

The formal foundation of the DPP in 1986 was a first big step towards an opposition party capable of challenging the dominant KMT. Alexander Yali Lu’s description of the young DPP is quite revealing in this context:

“The DPP is essentially a party movement. On the one hand, it functions as a normal party by participating in elections, engaging in legislative work, and even running a few county and city governments. On the other hand, it considers itself as a mass movement, the principal mission of which is to mobilize the people to exert pressure upon the ruling KMT and government to democratize the political structure as well as to carry out other reforms.”

(Lu 1992, p.129)

Yet despite its rising approval ratings during the late 1980s the party was always fraught with internal divisions. Originating out of the dangwai movement of the late 1970s, the DPP drew upon diverse support groups such as Taiwanese nationalists in the Writers and Editors Alliance (bianlian-hui) and democratic modernizers in the policy-oriented Dangwai Public Policy Research Association (gongzhenghui). Throughout the early 1980s it was Kang Ningshiang who managed to hold this deeply fragmented movement together (Fulda 2002, pp.374–380). After the foundation of the DPP

² On 07 April 2000 the founding chairman and 22 other members left the party. While the party has not been officially disbanded it continues to exist in name only (TPD, No. 66).
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in 1986, however, the activist New Tide faction (the successor of the bianlianhui) and the radical-turned-moderate Formosa faction competed for party leadership (Fulda 2000, p. 46). The selection of the four different party chairmen between 1986 and 1991 reflects the ongoing power struggle within the party. While Shelley Rigger is correct in saying that DPP party chairmen have mainly been coordinators and negotiators rather than strong party leaders (Rigger 2001, p. 57), she nevertheless downplays the party chairman’s important representative function. As the party chairman is the party’s face to the outside he is able to shape the party image to a considerable degree. This explains why the various factions have always been very keen on assuming the party chairmanship. The weakness of the party chairmen actually enabled the tightly organized New Tide faction to gradually take over control of the DPP’s party machine.

Bowing to the DPP’s radical activists in the late 1980s

The New Tide’s dominance within the DPP is best revealed by the fact that none of the seven DPP’s party chairmen from 1986 until 2000 has been elected without at least the tacit consent of this particular faction. Amongst the four party chairmen of the late 1980s only Jiang Pengjian (1st term) and Yao Jiawen (2nd) began their careers without a clear faction affiliation. Huang Xinjie (3rd and 4th) and Xu Xinliang (5th) on the other hand were affiliated with the radical-turned-moderate Formosa faction (Rigger 2001, p. 26). Yet they were all only able to become chairman because they bowed to the New Tide faction’s pressure. Jiang Pengjian became the party’s first chairman because of his activist inclination (Reinhardt 1989, p. 64) and because he was a Taiwanese, unlike his competitor Fei Xiping, a Mainland Chinese (Kang Ningxiang, interview with the author, 30.10.2001). Second party chairman Yao Jiawen on the other hand had to convince the party’s hardliners by coming out in strong support of Taiwan independence (FEER, 28.04.1988 and FEER 20.10.1988). Huang Xinjie’s radical past and his 8 years in prison gave him enough credibility to be easily elected as third party chairman. Xu Xinliang’s pro-TI agitation at the expense of New Tide favorite Shi Mingde in 1991 is another example of a moderate DPP politician’s need to appease the New Tide’s tough ideological stance. Xu’s election as party chairman in 1991 also put an end to the dominance of Formosa faction members as General Secretary. Xu had a hard time reappointing Zhang Junhong in 1991, as members of the New Tide criticized the latter for being too cooperative with the KMT (FEER, 24.10.1989). Xu consequently appointed Qiu Yiren, New Tide faction member and the party’s leading TI-ideologist as Deputy Secretary General (Wu 1995, p. 151). In
1996 he went even further and opted for Qiu as the new General Secretary. The New Tide faction has ever since held this post (Rigger 2001, p. 27).

An independent Taiwan? Towards a nation-building party in 1991

Under the New Tide’s pressure Yao Jiawen, the second party chairman, led the DPP away from its emphasis on Taiwan’s right of self-determination towards the more radical Taiwan Independence (TI) position. TI supporters became increasingly agitated towards the late 1980s. The self-immolation of Cheng Nanzong, a left-wing DPP-supporter and journalist, in April 1989 symbolized the increasing polarization over the issue (FEER, 20.04.1989). Lin Chengjie, a popular DPP lawmaker, resigned in protest against the New Tide’s intolerance towards TI sceptics (FEER, 20.06.1991). The return of many dissident overseas Taiwanese in the late 1980s and early 1990 accelerated the surge in pro-TI activism (Schubert 1994, pp. 267–270 and Wachman 1994, p. 118). The increasingly ideological conflict about self-determination vs. TI within the DPP stood in great contrast to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the OPP-predecessor dangwai had jointly exploited the ethnic cleavage for voter mobilization. But the adoption of the TI-party platform plank was certainly not inevitable. Cheng and Hsu are right in saying that the “DPP was not born as a nation-building party, but was turned into one via the shrewd manipulation by the New Tide faction on the issue of Taiwan independence” (Cheng and Hsu 1996, p. 139). While it led to elite settlement within the party its external implications were disastrous: it provoked the enmity of the DPP amongst hardliners in the KMT as well as the PRC’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By settling its internal elite conflict the DPP started a much bigger ideological dispute, which severely limited the DPP’s options in engaging its political opponents. It also discredited the idea of self-determination, since from 1991 onwards political opponents of the DPP would see any talk of self-determination as a euphemism for TI. From 1991 onwards both Taiwanese and foreign observers labelled the DPP as a reckless pro-independence party, thus leading to a serious image problem for Taiwan’s biggest opposition party.

Moderation and party transformation, 1991–2000

Despite a series of electoral setbacks – usually explained by the DPP’s overemphasis of the TI issue – the DPP made substantial headway throughout the 1990s. While it performed badly in the 1991 National Assembly election (Rigger 2001, p. 31) and suffered a severe setback in the first presidential election in 1996 it also had some spectacular electoral successes.
Among them were the Taipei mayoral race in 1994, the local elections in 1997 as well as the Gaoxiong mayoral race in 1998 (though it lost the Taipei mayoral race). When the DPP formally repositioned itself as a moderate centre-left Taiwanese party after its China conference in 1998 (Wu, 03.01.2000) it laid the foundation for its 2000 presidential election victory. Electoral successes, however, did not enable the DPP to make its long-held political aspirations come true. After the presidential election President Chen not only stuck to his election promise and refrained from declaring Taiwan’s independence, he also began emphasizing the need for “economic and cultural integration” with the Chinese mainland (Taipei Times, hitherto TT, 01.01.2001). Chen’s cautious approach in foreign affairs had much to do with his weak mandate and was also related to the DPP’s ongoing minority status in the legislature. In national legislative elections of the 1990s the DPP’s approval ratings never exceeded the 36.09% of the LY election in 1992 (Ger 1999, p. 36).

**Tactical or substantial moderation?**

The DPP’s electoral successes in the late 1990s were accompanied by the party’s ongoing moderation and transformation. After 1996 the DPP increasingly downplayed TI in election campaigns. This caused the TAIP split, but it had no lasting impact on the development of the DPP (Guo, Huang and Chiang 1998, p. 189). Consequently, the DPP began emphasizing positive issues such as clean government and anti-corruption policies. It was thus mainly responsible for the establishment of the so-called socio-economic cleavage, which could naturally be turned against the long ruling KMT (Li 1997, p. 42 and Kuo 1998, pp. 3-4). While the DPP’s moderation with regard to the TI issue was certainly substantial and not only tactical, one should not overestimate the degree of the learning process of the party as a whole. Although the DPP’s leading politicians have generally toned down their TI rhetoric the party is still controlled mainly by people who still believe strongly in the need for TI. As DPP legislator and Justice Alliance faction member Shen Fuxiong complained to the author in mid-2000: “The New Tide likes to run the party like a machine. They have been controlling this machine for a long time” (Shen Fuxiong, interview with the author, 04.09.2000). So far the DPP has stuck to its “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” which the DPP’s National Party Congress passed in May 1999. While the DPP’s new China policy is now being widely regarded as

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3 Chen Shuibian (DPP) won the presidential election only by a small margin (39.3%). Song Chuyu (Independent) garnered 36.84% of the total vote. Lian Zhan (KMT) finished as a distant third (Oscar Chung 2000, p. 10).
more binding than the 1991 TI party platform there is no guarantee that the DPP will not revert to its traditional position in the future. The KMT’s complete retreat from Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state“ formula shows how quickly new political stands can be abandoned once they seem to be no longer feasible.\(^4\)

**Appeasing the party’s hardliners throughout the 1990s**

The succession of the four party chairmen in the 1990s once again sheds light on the internal party development. Welfare State faction member Shi Mingde (6\(^{th}\) term), Formosa faction member Xu Xinliang (7\(^{th}\)), non-faction affiliated Lin Yixiong (8\(^{th}\)) and Welfare State faction founder Xie Chang-ting (9\(^{th}\) term) could only be elected because they were close to the New Tide faction in some way. As Linda Gail Arrigo argues, both Shi and Lin were alienated from the Formosa faction and “served as standard-bearers of the New Tide faction, because New Tide has stood behind whoever challenged the monopoly of the Meilidao faction” (Arrigo 1993, p. 159). Just like in 1991 Xu won the support of the New Tide faction by calling for a “Taiwan Party”, provoking strong protest from younger “Xin Shengdai [New Generation]” politicians who blamed him for his Taiwan chauvinism (TPD, No. 20). Shi on the other hand had long been a favorite of the New Tide, having spent half of his life in jail for challenging the ruling KMT, which earned him the label of being a Taiwanese Nelson Mandela. Yet both Shi and Xu actually emerged as surprisingly progressive politicians (FEER, 23.06.1994 and Rigger 2001, pp. 108–109). Not surprisingly, however, both reformers did not fare too well. Shi’s promotion of the so-called Grand Reconciliation with the pro-unification New Party (NP) met with strong resistance within the DPP. His narrow defeat in the LY speaker election in 1996 can clearly be attributed to internal dissatisfaction over his moderate stance vis-à-vis the NP (TPD, No. 18). Interestingly enough, party chairman Xu’s moderate politics after 1996 came under attack by a person who was to become increasingly important in the late 1990s: Taipei Mayor Chen Shuibian and founder of the parliament-based Justice Alliance faction. Chen relentlessly criticized Xu for being too moderate on core DPP issues such as TI. In particular Chen was against Xu’s contemplation of possible

\(^4\) On 03 August 2002 President Chen Shuibian backed legislation for an independence referendum and referred to China and Taiwan as two countries [a formula that strikingly resembled former President Lee Teng-hui’s comment of *special state-to-state-relations* between Taiwan and the PRC in 1999] in a televised speech to DPP supporters in Japan. This move can be seen as a first indicator that after assuming the chairmanship of the DPP in July 2002, Chen Shuibian needed to appease hardliners within his party – like all of his predecessors (CNN, 03.08.2002).
coalitions with the KMT. Also, although the TI plank increasingly became an anachronism and a hindrance for cross-party cooperation, Chen repeatedly argued against a party platform revision (TPD, No. 35 and 42). By taking a less conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the moderate factions within the DPP Chen could count on the tacit support of the New Tide faction. This strategic move would come in handy after the DPP decided to bend its own party rules to make way for Chen’s candidature in the 2000 presidential election (TPD, No. 56/57). Ironically, Chen took over most of Xu’s former positions once he had pushed him aside.

Much pain, no gain – the moderate reformers have left the party

The real reformers within the DPP however left the party: Xu Xinliang in May 1999 and Shi Mingde in November 2000. Shi had been particularly upset about President Chen’s refusal to form a coalition government with either PFP or NP after the presidential election (TPD, No. 69 and 72). In June 2001 former party chairmen Xu and Shi founded a new political organization called “shanmeng [Mountain]” in order to promote non-partisan reform politics. Shi’s indirect criticism of President Chen at the group’s founding press conference was harsh:

“Some politicians have overly emphasized the goal of seizing power. But [they] should thoroughly review the question of why some politicians who should not have been rejected were made powerless while some who are unfit to rule were empowered.” (TI, 03.08.2001c)

It thus is hardly surprising that ninth party chairman Xie Changting was unable to reform the party before his tenure ran out in 2002. The appointment of New Tide faction member Wu Nairen as Secretary General showed that Xie did not have the credentials to break the New Tide’s dominance within the party (TPD, No. 68/69). Despite being the founder of the Welfare State faction Xie had always been on good speaking terms with New Tide. He won their sympathies when serving as the head of the Social Movement Department in the late 1980s (FEER, 14.05.1987 and Reinhardt 1989, p. 72). The outcry amongst New Era faction members over his remark that Taiwan should not rule out unification as a possible option in dealing with mainland China showed how limited his options really were (China Post, hitherto CP, 15.09.2000, and TT, 13.09.2001). The controversy about his remark only highlighted the ongoing ideological divide within the DPP between the Mainstream Alliance on the one hand and the New Era and New Tide faction on the other. It was a repetition of the pre-1991 constellation, when the former Formosa faction was clearly pitted against the New Tide faction. Not surprisingly no majority could be found to abandon the TI platform plank after the 2000 presidential election (TT, 16.07.2000, and TPD, No. 53).
Factional balance throughout the 1990s

A review of the faction balance throughout the 1990s shows that the DPP has only temporarily overcome its sharp division into two camps. The TI compromise in 1991 certainly drew New Tide and Formosa closer together. While the New Tide faction accepted the ballot box as a means to achieve its nation-building ends, the Formosa faction benefited from the New Tide proponents’ mass appeal based on Taiwanese nationalism. The Formosa-New Tide coalition also led to the rise of the Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Schubert 1994, p.248–256). In the mid-1990s Stephan Grauwels observed that while the parliament-based Justice Alliance was closer to the Formosa faction, the Welfare State Alliance had stronger ties to the New Tide faction (TPD, No. 17). In 1997 Matei P. Mihalca came to a slightly different conclusion when he observed that the “founding factions [are] pitted against the more recent Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance” (China News, hitherto CN, 08.09.1997). I am inclined to follow Mihalca’s view as in February 1998 the smooth cooperation between Formosa and New Tide faction became most visible in the last big issue-compromise on the DPP’s economic policy towards China. Both Formosa and New Tide agreed on the “qiangben xijin [Strengthen the Base, Go Westward]” formula (Rigger 2001, p.130–131, TPD, No.42). Soon after the compromise the Formosa faction however increasingly merged into the other centrist factions and ceased to exist. The main reason was Xu Xinliang’s decision to leave the party and run as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential election. The Formosa faction thereby lost its long-term patron and vanished. In 1999 Zhang Junhong left the Formosa faction and founded the New Era faction. Xu Rongshu on the other hand reorganized the remains of the Formosa faction in the New Energy faction (Rigger 2001, p. 73). Since the Formosa faction’s demise, the New Tide faction is the only founding faction left. This has given the tightly organized New Tide a great leverage over all other party factions, making it almost an enemy (Wilson Tien, interview with the author, 01.11.2001).


In the aftermath of the presidential election both the New Era and the New Tide factions declined support of the parliament-based Mainstream Alliance. The moderate centrist factions thus combined in support of the DPP government while the New Era and New Tide faction chose to support President Chen only on a conditional basis. DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong, Justice Alliance faction member and founder of the Mainstream Coalition described the faction balance on the parliamentary level in autumn 2000 as follows:
"We formed the coalition which consists of 40 members out of 68 – so we make up more than 50 percent (...) Then you have the New Tide or the New Movement which consists of 14 to 15 members and the third one would be the so called New Century [New Era faction]. But I think the New Century is falling apart (...) In the future on the Congressional level [Legislative Yuan] there will be only the Mainstream [Alliance] and the New Tide. That will make the operation easier – at least from the administrative point of view.” (Shen Fuxiong, interview with the author, 04.09.2000)

The DPP’s party primaries for the parliamentary election at the end of the year 2001 already hinted at the New Tide faction’s rising significance within the DPP’s parliamentary caucus (TT, 12.04.2001). According to Myra Lu the New Tide faction garnered “seven magistral nominations and 21 legislative ones” (Lu, 29.08.2001). The New Tide’s expanding power base provoked some severe criticism from Zhang Junhong, leader of the DPP’s New Era faction:

“The way the New Tide faction feathers its nest by taking advantage of the ruling party’s resources is like the proliferation of cancer cells.” (TT, 30.08.2001)

Wilson Tien, Director of the DPP’s Department of International Affairs and former Deputy Director of the New Tide’s Office described the shift in the New Tide’s nomination policies as follows:

"In regard of Legislative Yuan candidates the New Tide normally would only nominate one candidate for each district because it can only handle one. But in this election they actually nominated a couple of candidates in some districts. In Zhanghua they nominated two, in Taizhong County three, in Taizhong City there are only two. But all these kinds of things have been planned and worked out.” (Wilson Tien, interview with the author, 01.11.2001)

And things worked out for the New Tide faction very well indeed. In the December 1st, 2001 election it got 17 of its legislators elected, while 4 of its magistrates were successful on the county level. As 5 out of 9 DPP county heads are strongly affiliated with the New Tide faction one can even argue that below the parliamentary level the combined factions of the Mainstream Alliance make up the non-mainstream within the DPP, while the New Tide faction represents the real mainstream of the party. It has thereby become both the biggest and most influential island wide faction (The Journalist, 02.12.2001). The New Tide’s increasing strength shows that the polarization of state and society after the presidential election clearly benefited the Taiwanese nationalists within the DPP. It is important to keep the election outcome in mind when looking back at some of the political controversies that took place between the 2000 presidential and the 2001 parliamentary election.
II. Continuity and change after the 2000 presidential election

While few foreign observers predicted that the DPP would win the presidency in 2000 (Rigger 2001, p. 2) many of them actually overestimated the degree of change that would take place after the election. David Shambaugh’s editorial for the Washington Post is a good example of such unrealistic expectations:

“Chen’s victory has finally broken the political machine and money politics of the Nationalists. But more important, it reveals the full flowering of the native Taiwanese identity separate from the Chinese mainlanders who have dominated Taiwan politics for half a century.” (David Shambaugh, 19.03.2000)

One can only wonder what kind of native Taiwanese identity is actually flowering under the new DPP-led minority government: roughly 16 years after coming into existence the party has developed from a clear pro-independence minded opposition party into a mainstream governing party, defending the status quo of the Republic of China’s (ROC) de-facto sovereignty. The DPP’s nation-building seems to have come to a halt. The new government’s refraining from pro-TI agitation from May 2000 until December 2001 had much to do with the new responsibility for the safety and well-being of the Taiwanese people. The remarkable lack of strong anti-PRC rhetoric (at least until August 2002) should be considered as a sign for the DPP’s genuine search for a solution to the cross-strait impasse. Still is quite an irony that the DPP developed from a loose group of dangwai-politicians lobbying for the right of self-determination of the ROC throughout the 1980s to a formal opposition party that advocated Taiwan Independence in the early 1990s and that ever since 1999/2000 the DPP’s leading personal once again upholds the principle of the ROC’s de-facto sovereignty.\(^5\) The DPP’s shifting policy preferences should be understood as a product of domestic power struggles during an election-driven Taiwanese democratisation throughout the 1990s. Yet regardless of the moderate stance of the new DPP-led minority government the island has been undergoing a rapid polarization of state and society ever since the presidential election (Taiwan Security Research, hitherto TSR, 09.08.2001). Three main factors have prevented major political breakthroughs within Taiwan and with regard to the ongoing cross-strait stalemate:

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\(^5\) When discussing this phenomenon with Kang Ningxiang, an old-time dangwai/DPP veteran and present Vice Defense Minister of the Republic of China, he told me that he found the development of the DPP during the last few years quite amusing. In his view the current DPP leadership followed exactly the political line, which he had advocated already in the early 1980s (interview with the author, 30.10.2001).
• The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) refusal to negotiate with the new DPP-government unless it accepts the “One-China” principle and abandons its TI party-platform has limited the options of the new administration in handling cross-strait relations and strained the Taiwanese political scene to an unprecedented degree.

• President Chen’s decision against a coalition government and his dependence on the support of the hardliners within the New Tide and New Era factions combined with blatant obstructionism by the opposition alliance of KMT, NP and PFP, created a deadlock situation, which prevented any kind of inter-party cooperation.

• The vast ideological differences in four highly disputed areas, namely: (1) the islanders’ ethnic, civic and national identity, (2) Taiwan’s contemporary history (3) the constitutional dilemma, (4) and political and institutional reform have proven to be major hindrances to even ad hoc agreements between the pan-blue and pan-green camp.

A third united front of KMT and CCP

Soon after the presidential election it became evident that the CCP would not accept the DPP as a counterpart as long as it does not support the “One China”-principle (People’s Daily, 21.03.2001). Such a precondition for political talks was clearly unacceptable for the new DPP administration. But as a consequence President Chen’s series of good will gestures failed to impress the Mainland Chinese government. On the domestic front, however, the DPP had to deal with a disloyal opposition alliance. Both KMT and NP broke long-time political taboos when they unilaterally established political contacts across the Taiwan straits. They thereby exploited the DPP government’s dilemma of not being able to communicate directly with their PRC counterparts. Throughout 2000/2001 high-ranking politicians of both parties repeatedly travelled to the PRC and engaged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a “third united front” strategy. This approach discredited the DPP as the sole legitimate representative of the ROC (Fulda 2001, p. 25) and prevented any kind of substantial breakthrough in cross-strait relations. Although political analysts have pointed out that throughout the 1990s the DPP and KMT party positions became increasingly similar regarding the question of unification and independence (Wu, 03.11.2000), this was certainly no longer the case after the KMT’s first setback in the March 2000 election. While former TI-advocate Chen Shuibian (Wachman 1994, p. 162) began championing the ROC’s de-facto sovereignty, the KMT under Lian Zhan unanimously retreated from former President Lee’s “special state-to-state” formula and began contemplating the idea of a “confederation” with
the PRC (Central News Agency, hitherto CNA, 10.06.2001). It seemed as if history was repeating itself, albeit in changed roles: In 1991 the DPP used the TI party platform to settle its elite conflict and to exert pressure on the ruling KMT. The post-2000 opposition KMT—pressured by Song Chuyu's unification-minded PFP—on the other hand used its reversed China policy as a major tool to fight the government.

Déjà vu? Polarization of state and society in 2000/2001

But regardless of the opposition's blatant obstructionism the new DPP administration also had to bear responsibility for the political deadlock. After his inauguration as the 10th president of the ROC Chen Shuibian made two major mistakes: He decided against a formal coalition agreement with either KMT, PFP or NP and chose to coalesce with public opinion instead. From the beginning his “government of all the people” (Rigger 2001, p. 201) was a big (and in hindsight lost) gamble to circumvent the opposition's majority in the legislature. Under strong pressure of the New Tide faction President Chen gave up on his “government of all the people” idea when he asked Premier Tang Fei (KMT) to resign. He consequently appointed Welfare State faction member and long-term DPP legislator Zhang Junxiong as the DPP's first-ever Premier (NPF Research Report, 10.08.2001). The second major mistake was giving in to the demand of the anti-nuclear minded New Tide and New Era faction and ordering a halt to the building of the fourth nuclear power plant (Liberty Times, hitherto LT, 10.08.2001, and TT, 05.08.2001). It was a welcome opportunity for KMT, PFP and NP to form the loose opposition alliance and refuse to cooperate with the new DPP government (TPD, No. 72). The opposition's own obstructionist intentions became most apparent when the KMT parliamentary caucus refused to pass a government bill to reduce working hours to 84 hours a fortnight. The KMT suggested a 44 hours per week-model instead, a proposal that not only went much further than that of the government but also completely contradicted former KMT policies related to the issue (TT, 20.05.2001). Such political events clearly demonstrated that while former president Lee Teng-hui can be credited with many of Taiwan's democratic reforms throughout the late 1980s and 1990s he has actually failed to reform his own party (TT, 15.06.2001). As a result Taiwan experienced a year of political stagnation after the presidential election. One cannot help but agree with Shelley Rigger's assessment that “transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are often protracted, and are nearly always fraught with uncertainty and peril” (TSR, 09.08.2001a). While the young DPP administration had great problems getting accustomed to its governing role, the opposition party's only concern seemed to have been a quick return to power. The gain
of the presidency thus made the DPP much more vulnerable to criticism both from within and outside the party. Since May 2000 the DPP had to fight battles from all sides: on the one hand it needed to convince its disappointed supporters of the necessity of President Chen’s “middle-of-the-road” politics (CNA, 20.03.2001, and TT, 24.02.2001). Many former DPP-inclined environmental activists were strongly opposed to the government’s decision to resume the building of the fourth nuclear power plant (TT, 15.02.2001). On the other hand it had to deal with a disloyal opposition alliance that exploited the young government’s inability to make progress as regards cross-strait affairs.

Taiwanese nationalism and the mainlanders’ national identity crisis

The one-year stalemate between the DPP government and the opposition could have been avoided: If both sides had been more willing to compromise on core party issues, Taiwan would not have encountered as many political controversies as it did. Yet the post-presidential election conflicts should have come as no surprise either. For instance, instead of looking for a common ground for political cooperation, radicals within the DPP and the opposition camp often played up the ideological differences among the parties. In Taiwanese domestic politics there are at least four highly disputed issues which have so far prevented any kind of broad consensus amongst policymakers on Taiwan’s future: (1) vastly differing notions of the islanders’ ethnic, civic and national identity, (2) competing constructs of Taiwan’s contemporary history, (3) the unresolved constitutional dilemma and (4) the DPP’s quest for political and institutional reform.

(1) The islanders’ ethnic, civic and national identity: The DPP’s leading proponents’ differentiation between cultural and political identity (Wachman 1994, p. 85) is at odds with the KMT’s long-term official ideology which promoted the idea of a trinity of Chinese cultural, political and national identity (ibid, p. 275). While former president Lee Teng-hui ushered in a period of Taiwanization (bentuhua) throughout the 1990s, his influence on the generally pro-unification minded KMT abated after he stepped down as KMT party chairman in the year 2000. His comeback as patron of the most recent KMT break-off, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), was mainly motivated by his disappointment with the KMT’s return to its Chinese roots under Lian Zhan (TT, 26.06.2001). As the TSU is widely regarded as even more TI minded than the DPP (FEER, 09.08.2001) it certainly contributes to the current polarization in Taiwan rather than helping to bridge the ideological gap between the pan-blue and pan-green camp. And because the current leadership of the DPP mainly comprises Formosa-generation politicians and former independence zealots of the New Tide faction (CNA,
20.04.2001, and Rigger 2001, pp. 84–86), the conflict about Taiwan’s national identity between Taiwan nationalists on the one hand and pro-unification opposition politicians in the new KMT, PFP and NP on the other (Tien and Cheng 1999, pp. 24–25) is likely to survive until well into the 21st century.\footnote{Taiwan’s national identity crisis is essentially a political conflict couched in rhetoric that stresses constructed ethnic differences between two social groups, the benshengren and waishengren. This conflict has evolved around the problems of (a) the authoritative allocation of resources and (b) by whom and how the Taiwanese people should be represented. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of party cleavages in Taiwan see Ming-tong Chen, \textit{Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan’s Democratization}, pp. 184–190, and Yun-han Chu and Chia-lung Lin’s article \textit{The Construction of Taiwanese Identity and Cross-Strait Relations}, available from the web: http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/TS-Lin.htm (downloaded 03 January 2000).}

\textbf{(2) Competing constructs of Taiwan’s contemporary history:} The DPP’s new cultural policies reverse the official reading of Taiwan’s contemporary history almost completely. Geoffrey Voorhies observed in an article in \textit{Newsweek} that “Taiwanese textbooks have undergone some of the most drastic rewriting: now high-school histories delve into indigenous history, Kuomintang military abuses and communist rule on the mainland – topics barely mentioned under nationalistic rule” (\textit{Newsweek}, 27.08.2001). The dangwai/DPP opposition in Taiwan has always used revelations about the “darker chapters in the history of the ruling KMT” (Sachsenröder 1998, p. 8, and FEER, 10.03.1988) as a means to write its alternative version of the island’s contemporary history. The Kobayashi controversy in 2001 has shown how much the competing constructs of history matter in contemporary Taiwanese politics (Fulda, 2001a, pp. 16–17). Depending on which of the two very different Chinese diasporas that members of Taiwan’s political elite belong to, they are likely to have a diametrically opposed view of the island’s colonial history: (1) Both the descendents of Chinese settlers who migrated to Taiwan before 1945 (benshengren) and returning overseas Taiwanese of the 1980s and 90s are more inclined to view the Japanese colonial era in a positive light. (2) The first, second and third generation of mainland Chinese (waishengren) who came to Taiwan after 1945 however often perceive the native Taiwanese pro-Japan sentiments as revisionism and as proof of the benshengren’s essentially anti-Chinese mindset. Former president Lee’s pro-Japanese sentiments for example repeatedly outraged conservative members within the KMT, NP and PFP. But there are even more divisions along ideological lines between the pan-blue and the pan-green camp.

\textbf{(3) The constitutional dilemma:} There can be no doubt that the structural flaws of the revised ROC constitution actually facilitate the political im-
passe. Partisan politics of all major political parties had hijacked constitutional reform from April 1991 until September 1997 (Halbeisen 1997, pp. 17–19). As Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng argued, the “discourse was based entirely on political calculus rather than on academic arguments” (Tien and Cheng 1999, p. 29). The revised constitution created a flawed constitutional framework within which the DPP and the opposition parties now find it equally difficult to operate. Besides, the strong disagreement between government and opposition is not only limited to different interpretations of the ROC constitution. There is also antagonism amongst Taiwanese policymakers, which cannot be fully explained by the unification vs. TI divide. Only the vastly differing conceptions of nation-building reveal why any kind of cross-party consensus on Taiwan’s future is so difficult to achieve.

(4) Political reform: A major issue that is likely to spark controversy is the DPP’s ongoing advocacy of political reform. The DPP’s proposal to abandon village and township elections endangers the opposition’s last remaining stronghold, as local factions are still predominantly controlled by either KMT or PFP (Tien 1989, Chen 1996, Kuo 2000). Given that the KMT gained considerable power in the 2001 county magistrates election, conflicts about central-local budget allocation will also increase. Here the DPP’s insistence on the autonomy of the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), which since 1998 is responsible for allocation of funds for small-scale construction projects, meets with strong resistance from the opposition, which fears being cut off from the money distribution process (Göbel 2001, p. 13).

What are the chances for political reconciliation?

Major political and philosophical differences amongst the Taiwanese political elite have increased the feeling of uncertainty amongst many members of the politically highly significant second and third generation of mainlanders, in particular those living in the capital city of Taipei. On the one hand the waishengren’s national identity crisis in an increasingly localized post-martial law Taiwan (Corcuff 2001) is a major obstacle to the establishment of a cross-party consensus on the island’s future development. Their deep mistrust of the DPP (Liu 1995, p. 112) can be seen as a major hindrance to reconciliation between the pan-blue and pan-green camp. On the other hand it can be argued that they may have many reasons to be wary of the DPP’s overall moderation. They certainly remember the former opposition party’s repeated exploitation of the ethnic cleavage in election campaigns throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Many skirmishes between DPP and NP supporters throughout the 1990s have created a tense
atmosphere between both political camps (FEER, 06.10.1994). Yet reconciliation efforts such as those of former DPP party chairman Shi Mingde should not be forgotten either. DPP-legislator and Mainstream Coalition member Wang Tuo reiterated Shi’s advocacy of political reconciliation shortly before the 01 December 2001 parliamentary election (TT, 03.09.2001). His words should be taken at face value. However, it will remain to be seen whether members of the New Tide faction are equally willing to become reconciled with their long-term political adversaries. The “Xin Taiwan ren [New Taiwanese]” concept could have been a constructivist way of alleviating group conflicts between benshengren and waishengren. Unfortunately former president Lee Teng-hui and incumbent Taipei mayor Ma Yingjiu exploited the idea for the sake of short-term partisan gains in 1998. Most political analysts agree that Lee’s support for mainland-born Ma actually decided the close Taipei mayoral election (TPD, No. 52, and Copper 1999, pp. 27–28). In short, political reconciliation will very much depend on whether Taiwanese policymakers from all parties are able to compromise on their respective party’s core issues and form inter-party coalitions after the December 1st, 2001 parliamentary election despite their greatly varying political values and philosophies. The likelihood of such inter-party cooperation will be discussed in the third and final part of the analysis.

III. DPP factionalism and the prospect of inter-party coalitions after the 2001 parliamentary election

The New Era and New Tide factions obstructed inter-party cooperation after the 2000 presidential election by taking a hard-line stance on the fourth nuclear power plant-issue. The two factions’ opposition was motivated partly by their genuine concern for the environment and partly by their general anti-coalition attitude. Factionalism within the DPP thus had mainly disruptive implications after the presidential election. President Chen’s decision to avoid inter-party coalitions and to rule as a minority government was most certainly influenced by the two factions’ strong opposition to Premier Tang Fei (KMT). After Tang Fei resigned President Chen publicly used the allusion of a rock that had been removed from the road. While many political observers assumed that he was referring to Premier Tang Fei, President Chen later elaborated upon his comment and said that he was actually talking about his own party, the DPP. He thereby indi-
rectly criticized New Tide faction members who had to be bought off with posts in the DPP cabinet of second Premier Zhang Junxiong (TPD, No. 71). The fourth nuclear power plant controversy demonstrated that the New Tide’s ideological dominance vis-à-vis the Mainstream Alliance actually hampered the development of the DPP as a credible governing party. President Chen’s strong dependence on the party’s hardliners revealed that the New Tide faction actually holds a quasi sacrosanct position within the DPP. A report from the KMT-affiliated National Policy Foundation think-tank consequently labelled the New Tide faction as “danyi paixi duda [most dominant single faction]“ in the year 2001 (NPF Research Report, 10.08.2001). But President Chen himself also explicitly criticized the New Tide for its strong factional egoism in his book “Shiji shou hang”, published in the run-up for the 2001 parliamentary election (The Journalist, 08.11.2001). He warned his party that “this might be the only chance the DPP has to rule, because of the failure to transform itself” (TT, 02.11. 2001). The fact that the New Tide turned out to be the biggest winner in the December 1st election shows that the DPP is unlikely to become a more pragmatic ruling party in the near future.

The winner takes all?

Yet President Chen himself has long held the “winner-takes-all”-attitude, which has made formal inter-party cooperation less likely (TPD, No. 35). As during his tenure as Taipei Mayor from 1994 until 1998 (TPD, No. 5) Chen Shuibian co-opted outstanding opposition politicians into the government instead of binding himself to an official coalition accord between parties. This approach, however, failed to foster even ad hoc coalitions in the LY. Chen Shuibian also overestimated his executive rights when likening himself to an American President. His posture is at odds with the ROC’s constitution, which envisages a dual-head government system in which the President and the Premier share their power. Also, the way in which Chen Shuibian selected his personnel drew strong criticism from DPP General Secretary and New Tide faction member Wu Nairen, who complained that neither the DPP’s nor the KMT’s party headquarters had been consulted prior to the appointment of cabinet members (TT, 18.04.2000). It is noteworthy that only a small minority of members of the Tang Fei cabinet were actually affiliated with the DPP (Rigger 2001, p. 208). This led to a general dispute about the allocation of government posts within the DPP. The question of who gets access to government resources is also strongly interrelated with the controversial issue of inter-party coalitions.
The DPP at the crossroads

After a year in office President Chen retreated from his former anti-coalition stance (*China Times*, hitherto CT, 20.11.2000) and indicated in May 2001 for the first time that “the DPP will unite with those from the opposition parties who harbour similar ideas to compose a stable majority force” after the LY election (TT, 20.05.2001). Chen’s second thoughts revealed that the president now openly acknowledged that the executive cannot govern against a legislature controlled by the opposition. Shortly before the 01 December 2001 parliamentary election he elaborated on his coalition concept and called for a “cross-party alliance for national stability”. It soon became clear that his focus had gradually shifted from a party-to-party coalition to a more selective cooptation of parts of the opposition. Not surprisingly both KMT and PFP rejected his offer (TT, 23.11.2001a). If they had agreed the DPP would have had to compromise even further on core issues such as its TI plank and its anti-nuclear policies. It would have meant that the DPP would have finally had to come to terms with its political aspirations and match them with political reality. However, given the KMT’s and PFP’s refusal to join a formal coalition government and the DPP’s reluctance to openly challenge the party’s hardliners until the present day, I would argue that further compromises on party ideology are not very likely in the short and medium term. In the following I will outline the various factions’ attitudes towards inter-party cooperation.

Faction attitudes towards inter-party cooperation

Although many of the DPP’s former party positions have already changed and are almost beyond recognition, the moderation of core party issues has so far mainly been a process within the DPP. The biggest incentive for issue compromises was party unity that would pay off during election times. After all, the strong increase in popularity throughout the 1990s benefited all DPP factions. Yet after winning the presidency this logic no longer applies. While the party has gained a considerable amount of political power, in the future it will also need to share power in order to maintain its governing status. This will lead to unavoidable frictions within the DPP. As Ian Budge once observed, “factions are more likely to agree with other factions inside rather than outside the party” (Budge 1984, p.3). Although Budge was mainly talking about Western post-war democracies, his observation equally holds true in the case of the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party. As has been argued above, the DPP has been flexible in adopting new policies. Paradoxically, this pragmatism was accompanied by a cementation of the party hardliners’ dominant position within the party. Of course their anti-coalition stance does not make inter-party coalition inconceivable
but it will certainly increase the cost of inter-party cooperation. Regardless of the changing power balance among the DPP's factions, their leading proponents have been largely consistent in their attitudes towards inter-party cooperation. At least three streams of opinions may be discerned amongst the various factions:

- opposition to any kind of inter-party coalition (New Era faction, New Tide faction, Taiwan Independence Alliance)
- coalitions only with the KMT (former Formosa faction, Justice Alliance, New Energy faction, Mainstream Coalition)
- coalitions with either KMT or anti-KMT forces such as NP, PFP and TSU (Welfare State Alliance)

The faction's coalition preferences may not always be that clear-cut. Yet comments of long-term faction leaders on prospective inter-party coalitions throughout the years indicate certain tendencies. As the factions are centered around political patrons, the political attitude of the leading individual is thus of great significance. An exception to the rule is the current Mainstream Coalition, the meta-faction in the legislature, which was founded by Cai Chunlong and Justice Alliance member Shen Fuxiong on behalf of President Chen. Shen Fuxiong's leading role suggests that the Mainstream Coalition is strongly influenced by the parliament-based Justice Alliance. Similar to the DPP caucus the system of rotating leadership is more commonplace in the Mainstream Coalition than in other DPP factions. Not surprisingly, no DPP faction fancies forming a coalition only with the NP or PFP. While the Welfare State Alliance might be the most pragmatic (or unpredictable) faction in terms of its coalition stance, the New Era and New Tide factions are the ones against any kind of inter-party coalition. Their anti-coalition stance is likely to bring them into opposition with the Mainstream Coalition. According to Shen Fuxiong, 70% of the Mainstream Coalition members favoured a DPP-KMT alliance to any other option after the LY 2001 election (TT, 25.04.2001 and 19.05.2001). The DPP is thus deeply divided over the issue of inter-party cooperation.

The role of party ideology and faction organization

In view of the factionalism in the DPP discussed above, how likely is inter-party cooperation at all? I would argue that any kind of formal coalition

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8 I derived the various faction leaders' attitudes from 231 DPP-related articles in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER) from 1986 until 1994 and from 73 issues of the monthly *Taiwan Political Digest* (TPD) between 1994 and 2000. While such an approach may be called impressionistic, it is a feasible approach given the highly personal and informal nature of DPP elite politics.
agreement is going to be an accord amongst factions rather than parties. Although Taiwan’s political parties have greatly varying party ideologies, they lack explicit party programs (Fell 2001). Many of the party’s issue positions are thus in a constant flux. This makes inter-party cooperation much more complicated, as coalition agreements will naturally have to take into account the diverse ideological stands of the parties. Yet it is inconceivable how parties such as the DPP and the NP can possibly find a compromise on zero-sum issues such as the ROC’s de facto sovereignty. The various party ideologies make DPP coalitions with anti-KMT parties such as NP and PFP very unlikely. Inter-party compromise is possible only when the parties’ core issues remain untouched. The Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) in 2001 might signify successful inter-party cooperation regarding economic issues. But at the same time it is also a good example of re-active rather than pro-active policy making (CP, 31.08. 2001).

The likely cost of the Lee-Bian alliance

Some political commentators argued that the newly founded TSU would help the DPP to build a stable majority in the legislature. The election result however showed that the so-called Lee-Bian alliance, which currently compromises 100 legislators, is not powerful enough to overcome the combined opposition’s majority in the legislature (125 legislators). While the TSU performed surprisingly well in the 01 December 2001 parliamentary election its pro-TI stance still makes it a strong electoral competitor for the New Tide faction. During the parliamentary election campaign members of the New Tide were amongst the fiercest critics of the TSU (CP, 07.08.2001). The DPP’s reliance on the TSU could betray many of its moderation efforts of the 1990s: the TSU and its patron Lee Teng-hui will almost certainly prevent the DPP government from taking a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the Chinese mainland. President Chen’s “olive branch” policies from 2000 until 2001 could thus be easily compromised should the TSU pressure the DPP to fall back on its more traditional stance towards the People’s Republic of China (as his remarks on 03 August 2002 regarding the issue of a referendum on TI seem to indicate).

No stable majority in sight

Yet the inner logic of factionalism itself prevents stable long-term agreements between factions of different parties. As the major incentive for joining a faction is patronage, pay-off of any kind for inter-party compromise on government appointments is likely to stir up factional infighting.
Here the nature of politics becomes most apparent: it is all about “who gets what, when, how, and at whose expense” (Fukui 2000, p. 1). Disagreements on resource distribution will almost certainly have an effect on party unity. The aforementioned power struggle among the New Era and New Tide factions and President Chen calls into question whether the DPP as a whole is capable of forming inter-party coalitions at all. Back in 1996 Taiwan expert Stephan Grauwels discussed the likely cost of inter-party compromise for the DPP:

“Any significant DPP concessions on national identity or money politics might cause tensions within the DPP at best, or a split at worst, with especially the New Tide breaking away and realigning in a new, more “puritanical” party on the left of the political spectrum. The DPP would thus lose the support of ardent independentists, who at present are still a captive market for the party.” (Grauwels 1996, p. 97)

While a break-off of the New Tide faction from the DPP, as envisaged by Stephan Grauwels may not be imminent, the New Tide is likely to obstruct any formal coalition agreement with the DPP’s political opponents out of partisan interests. One should not forget, however, that there have been issue coalitions between DPP and NP in the past (Tien and Chu 1996, p. 1165). However, inter-party cooperation throughout the 1990s was mainly motivated by political opportunism and did not reflect any kind of broad mainstream consensus amongst Taiwanese policymakers. Likewise, the cooperation between DPP and KMT during the constitutional reform debate was merely an outcome of a tacit agreement between Lee Teng-hui’s Mainstream Alliance and Chen Shuibian’s Justice Alliance that Taiwan should have a semi-presidential rather than a parliamentary system (Cheng and Chou 2000, pp. 50–54). Organized inter-party initiatives such as the “Clean Parliament Alliance” on the parliamentary level, comprising eight legislators of the DPP, KMT, NP and PFP, are a rare exception to the rule (CNA, 01.08.2001).

Progressive?

What matters more than the experience of former ad hoc issue coalitions are the structural impediments to any kind of future inter-party coalition. Here the organizational nature of DPP factions plays a crucial role. While the parliament-based Mainstream Alliance may indicate a departure from the DPP’s rampant party factionalism, the New Tide faction essentially remains a party within the party. The former factions are characterized by their open and fluid structure, as can be seen in their willingness to allow double faction membership (Cheng and Chou 2000, pp. 61–63). The present New Tide faction however is a closed faction, with its own exclusive island-wide faction branches and personnel, which is only loyal to the New Tide faction
The Politics of Factionalism in Taiwan's DPP

While the centrist factions of the Mainstream Alliance resemble party factions that can be found in Japan, Italy and Israel, the New Tide faction is more similar to factions within the CCP and the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Huang 1992, p. 68). Not surprisingly, the New Tide has thus opted to stay out of the Mainstream Coalition. While the Mainstream Alliance is steering towards a Japanization of the party, the New Tide faction's opaque faction structure remains unchanged.

"The Mainstream Alliance legislators have run a fundraising campaign which has drawn a lot of criticism from the media. Their goal is to get enough money to sponsor each legislator. They are thereby exactly following the Japanese model. In case it is a workable and successful model, the Mainstream Alliance will be very influential in the future. But right now it is not (...)

During last year's CSC election the Welfare Faction didn't work with the Justice Alliance and the New Energy faction. Although these three factions formed the Mainstream Alliance they still acted independently. This is the main reason why I think that the Mainstream Alliance isn't that powerful at all at this point." (Wilson Tien, interview with the author, 01.11.2001)

The lack of unity within the Mainstream Alliance has enabled the New Tide faction to successfully defend its monopoly within the party apparatus. While the DPP struggles to find a new internal consensus on its future party development, the KMT's former parliamentary factions increasingly break off and emerge as new political parties. The KMT's disintegration into (1) new-KMT, (2) NP, (3) PFP, and (4) TSU has thus accelerated the tendency towards partisan politics in Taiwan. While some political observers have emphasized that after the presidential election in March 2000 "any political group, any political combination, any political candidate can now come to power" (TPD, No. 73), it can also be argued that the increasing political fragmentation is likely to prevent stable inter-party coalitions and faction politics will almost certainly be extremely detrimental to future political developments on Taiwan.

Conclusion

In times of opposition the DPP managed to maintain its unity through factional compromise. The incorporation of the controversial TI plank into the party platform consolidated the young opposition party. But the DPP’s elite settlement in 1991 came at a high cost. It cemented the position of the party’s hardliners and antagonized political opponents within and outside Taiwan. While the party gradually moderated its TI stance the party core is still convinced of the need for TI. Throughout the 1990s the party pro-
gressed in terms of electoral successes. After the presidential election in 2000, however, it had to pay dearly for its failure to confront the party's hardliners.

After Chen Shuibian's inauguration as the 10th president of the ROC the island has been undergoing a rapid polarization of state and society. The governing DPP came under pressure from both radicals within the pan-green and pan-blue camp. The avoidable one-year stalemate between government and opposition could only come to an end after the LY election at the end of 2001. After a year in office President Chen Shuibian finally acknowledged that without a majority in the legislature his government is unlikely to succeed in implementing its reform agenda. However, I have argued that any formal coalition agreement in the future is likely to be an accord among factions rather than parties. The discussion of DPP-factions' attitudes towards inter-party cooperation revealed that the DPP is deeply divided over the issue of inter-party coalitions, especially when it comes to possible coalitions with parties of the pan-blue camp.

While the Taiwanese media worries most about the DPP becoming corrupt now that it has a hold on power (CT, 17.07.2001, TT, 17.07.2000 and 18.07.2000), in fact the party faces much bigger challenges than that of possible corruption. It has to leave behind its opposition tactics and readjust to a generally unfavourable political climate after its victory in the presidential and parliamentary election. The DPP's behaviour as a disloyal opposition throughout the 1980s and 1990s could still be explained by the need to push for a democratisation of the KMT-party state. Its overemphasis on the national identity-cleavage, however, antagonized policymakers in the KMT, NP and PFP and led to a polarization and over-politicisation on the island. Now that the DPP attempts to rule the country it will have to come to terms with its former political aspirations. The DPP's General Secretary Wu Nairen acknowledged in an interview: "While the DPP has not lied, it also hasn't told the whole truth for a long time" (Rigger 2001, p. 132). The party thus has to confront its dissatisfied supporters and defend itself against its highly opportunistic opponents.

Whether the DPP will manage to cope with the many challenges remains to be seen. Fractional politics throughout the party's existence could not prevent the DPP's progressive rise to power. Now that it has a hold on power, however, factionalism within the party has increasingly disruptive implications. As I have tried to show, DPP factionalism and partisan politics within the other Taiwanese parties have prevented the establishment of a moderate political mainstream. The deep ideological division amongst the Taiwanese political elite now not only greatly undermines the young democracy's stable development but also ultimately endangers Taiwan's bargaining position in future cross-strait negotiations with the PRC.
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